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Abstract: The principle of prohibition of abuse of rights is applicable in fields as varied as the free 
movement of goods (judgment of 10 of January 1985, Association des Centres distributeurs Leclerc 
and Thouars Distribution, Case 229/83), freedom to provide services (judgment of 3 of February 1993, 
Veronica Omroep Organisatie, Case C‑148/91), public service contracts (judgment of 11 of December 
2014, Azienda sanitaria locale n. 5 Spezzino and Others, Case C-113/13), freedom of establishment 
(judgment of 9 of March 1999, Centros, Case C‑212/97), company law (judgment of 23 of March 2000, 
Diamantis, Case C‑373/97), social security (judgments of 2 of May 1996, Paletta, Case C‑206/94; of 6 
of February 2018, Altun and Others, Case C‑359/16; and of 11 of July 2018, Commission v Belgium, 
Case C‑356/15), transport (judgment of 6 of April 2006, Agip Petroli, Case C‑456/04), social policy 
(judgment of 28 of July 2016, Kratzer, Case C‑423/15), restrictive measures (judgment of 21 of Decem-
ber 2011, Afrasiabi and Others, Case C‑72/11) and value added tax (judgment of 21 of February 2006, 
Halifax and Others, Case C‑255/02) and, in that sense, the EU principle of prohibition of abuse of law 
has been developing within the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union since the 
mid‑1970s, addressing it in multiple ways, not only in the face of different factual assumptions, which 
would be understandable and even necessary but, in its evolution, treating asymmetrically the handling 
of the requirements that must be met to reach the conclusion of the existence of practices abusive.
Keywords: Abuse of law, European Union Law, Jurisprudence, Tax Law.
Resumen: El principio de prohibición del abuso de derechos es aplicable en ámbitos tan variados 
como la libre circulación de mercancías (sentencia de 10 de enero de 1985, Association des Centres dis-
tributeurs Leclerc and Thouars Distribution, Asunto 229/83), libre prestación de servicios (sentencia de 
3 de febrero de 1993, Veronica Omroep Organisatie, Asunto C-148/91), contratos públicos (sentencia de 
11 de diciembre de 2014, Azienda sanitaria locale n. 5 Spezzino y otros, Asunto C‑113/13), libertad de 
establecimiento (sentencia de 9 de marzo de 1999, Centros, Asunto C-212/97), derecho societario (sen-
tencia de 23 de marzo de 2000, Diamantis, Asunto C‑373/97), seguridad social (sentencias de 2 de mayo 
de 1996, Paletta, Asunto C‑206/94; de 6 de febrero de 2018, Altun y otros, Asunto C‑359/16; o de 11 de 
julio de 2018, Comisión/Bélgica, Asunto C‑356/15), transporte (sentencia de 6 de abril de 2006, Agip 
Petroli, Asunto C‑456/04), política social (sentencia de 28 de julio de 2016, Kratzer, Asunto C‑423/15), 
medidas restrictivas (sentencia de 21 de diciembre de 2011, Afrasiabi y otros, Asunto C‑72/11) o so-
bre el Impuesto sobre el Valor Añadido (sentencia de 21 de febrero de 2006, Halifax y otros, Asunto 
C‑255/02) y, en este sentido, el principio de la Unión de prohibición del abuso de Estado se ha ido de-
sarrollando dentro de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea desde mediados de 
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la década de 1970, abordándolo de múltiples maneras, no solo frente a diferentes supuestos de hecho, lo 
cual sería entendible y hasta necesario sino, en su evolución, tratando de manera asimétrica el manejo 
de los requisitos que han de concurrir para llegar a la conclusión de la existencia de prácticas abusivas. 
Palabras clave: Abuso del derecho, Unión Europea, Jurisprudencia, Derecho fiscal y financiero.
Sumario: I. Introduction. II. The concept of abuse of law in the jurisprudence of the Court of 
the European Union: the prohibition of abuse in the European legal order. 1. Economic globalization 
and tax competition: tax planning and the general framework of the anti‑abuse case. 2. Terminolo-
gical and conceptual evolution of abuse of rights in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in the 
European Union: the abuse of freedoms of the European Union. A) The abuse of law within the Eu-
ropean Union. B) The abuse of law in its application of EU Freedoms. 3. Synthesis of the evolution 
of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in the European Union. III. The jurisprudential doctrine 
on the abuse of rights on tax matters. 1. UE measures against abusive practices regarding tax. 2. The 
fight against abusive practices such as justification of tax discriminatory or restriction of freedom of 
establishment rules. A) Factual situations that invoke the fight against abusive practices in taxation 
as justification. B) The jurisprudential doctrine of justification. a) The jurisprudential analysis of na-
tional anti‑abuse tax law. b) Proportionality test and the existence of wholly artificial arrangements. 
IV. A concept of an abuse in UE law in tax matters.
I. Introduction
1. In this decade EU Member States face new challenges and have a strategic and fundamental
objective to obtain an adequate level of revenue to finance public spending.  
2. The economic globalization (corporate and private) puts pressure on the competitiveness of
the tax systems, and within this framework the Member States have total freedom to establish their fiscal 
policy according to their needs and national objectives. Nevertheless, in the context of fiscal sovereignty 
integrated in a supranational framework, like the European Union, it is necessary to ensure that non‑
harmonized national tax systems work properly when interacting with each other, not only to overcome 
obstacles that could appear in the confrontation of national sovereignty facing European law, but also 
to avoid erosion of the tax bases of the Member States. It is becoming increasingly clear that the lack 
of coordination between the direct tax systems may lead to an erosion of tax revenues, undermining the 
ability of EU Member States to acquire balanced and efficient tax systems, which in turn, can affect the 
sustainability of the finance of social models in communal countries1.  
3. Undoubtedly, a fiscal treatment in Europe, which purports to be coordinated and coherent,
involves eliminating all traces of discrimination and double taxation (examples of challenges that make 
full coexistence difficult between Member State´s own tax sovereigns and Laws within the European 
Union) as well as, obviously, reducing the costs of compliance of the legislation that involves the subject 
of more than one tax system.  
4. However, discontinuities between tax systems due to the lack of targeted coordination can
also lead to the existence of cases of unintentional non‑taxation or, what could be more serious, to the 
existence of scope for abuse—both scenarios being equally detrimental to the interests of the Internal 
Market as these undermine the fairness and balance of the EU Member States´ tax systems2. Combat-
1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the regions, European values in the globalised world Contribution of the Commission to the 
October meeting of Heads of State and Governmen, COM (2005) 525 final, Brussels, 3.11.2005.
2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee, Co‑ordinating Member States’ direct tax systems in the Internal Market, COM (2006) 823, Brussels, 19.12.2006.
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ting abusive practices, balanced with the need of avoiding a disproportionate restriction in cross‑border 
activity inside the European Union, are a challenge that not only does it the Member States, but also 
the Court itself, in its attempt to set a definition, as accurate as possible, for the term «abuse of rights». 
5. This presents serious difficulties due to various factors: firstly, to abstract a unique concept 
of Legal abuse in different national legislations of Member States, because on the one hand, there is a 
diversity of rules, techniques, and concepts with anti‑elusive outcomes, both in comparative Law and 
in the same national legislation. On the other hand, the fact that the reactions of the systems themselves 
are different depending on the variety of anti‑abuse rules containing its legislation. This makes forming 
a homogeneous doctrine on legal abuse and consistently applying European Union law in its relation-
ship with national law on this matter particularly complex. This leads to admit that secondly, there is 
not a generally valid definition of the concept at UE level. This doctrine is still in construction, as a 
consequence of a «process of dialogue between the Court of Justice in the European Union and national 
courts»3 or, like DE LA FERIA said, it is argued elsewhere that the process is better designated as a 
one of reverberation4. Finally, the difficulty that surrounds the complexity of the relationship between 
anti‑abuse measures in national legal systems, and their compatibility with the European Union legal 
systems, especially with the practice of fundamental rights contained in the treaty that are a cornerstone 
in the construction of the European Union. 
6. Yet despite the obvious difficulties, the purpose of this paper is none other than the study of 
anti‑abuse doctrines that made the European Court of Justice. Though having great interest in the con-
figuration of the doctrine at national levels, especially the Spanish doctrine, we understand that it is not 
appropriate to refer to them at this moment, given the limited research that is exclusive to a European 
Union level. Similarly, bearing in mind that the doctrine of Legal abuse originates in different areas rela-
ted to fundamental freedoms, our main analysis objective focuses on the practice of freedom enactments. 
This is because in the practice of this freedom, where they have dictated the most complex declarations 
of the Court and where they have configured the important concept of a «wholly artificial arrangement» 
through notorious cases such as Cadbury, Schweppes, or Marks & Spencer. Therefore, this study will 
focus on the identification, classification and analysis of the jurisprudence delivered by the Court, not 
only understanding the pioneering judgments in the construction of the doctrine, but also those that have 
been outlined, clarified, or expanded in the concept or its range of application, and contextualized in 
the factual circumstances in which the doctrine deals with abuse. In this research, we will try to extract 
a definition of abuse of law that may be useful to understand, in its innermost structure, what meaning 
reaches the teleological interpretation of rules and to what extent it influences the behaviour of subjects 
who are bound to them. The research is not simple, because the Court has had multiple ways of tackling 
the topic of legal abuse, and not only facing different factual circumstances, which would be understan-
dable and even necessary, but in its evolution, it has treated management requirements asymmetrically 
that have to be met to reach the conclusion of the existence of abusive practices. Regarding the structure 
of the work, the start of the investigation will focus on, firstly, the terminological and conceptual study 
of the generic notion of abuse of law in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, intending to 
cover the impact of the European Union freedom practices in order to try to conclude with a synthesis 
of the evolution of this doctrine. 
7. The objective deals with the practice of the freedom of establishment and the impact that such 
exercise has on purely tax contexts, to then conduct a study of EU measures against abusive practices on 
fiscal matters, which will allow us to analyse the reaction mechanisms that the legal system has created 
against the practices mentioned and in cases which have been constitutive of justifications for discrimi-
3 a. zalasinski, “Some basic aspects of the concept of abuse in the tax case law of the European Court of Justice”, in In-
tertax, vol. 36, nº 4, 2008, p.157.
4 r. De la Feria, “Introducing the Principle of Prohibition of Abuse of Law”, in r. De la Feria and s. Vogenauer (Eds.), 
Prohibition of Abuse of Law: ¿A new general Principle of EU Law?, Oxford Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011.
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natory treatment, or particularly restrictive of the freedom of establishment. To do this, understanding 
the factual assumptions which are invoked in the fight against abusive practices in taxation, its jurispru-
dential treatment, and most importantly, to get to know exactly when we are faced with the existence of 
a wholly artificial arrangement will allow us to develop, and justify, a concept of abuse of law within 
the European Union, despite the Court had been alluding to abuse and abusive practices in its rulings for 
more than forty years and, for a long time, however, the significance of these references was unclear5. 
II. The concept of abuse of law in the jurisprudence of the Court of the European Union: the pro-
hibition of abuse in the European legal order 
1. Economic globalization and tax competition: tax planning and the general framework of the 
anti-abuse case 
8. It is known that the implementation of general and specific anti‑avoidance rules in an inter-
national environment is complex due to the diversity of legal rules and contexts that must be interpreted 
strictly6. In addition, all reflections on international tax law must involve the study of their integration 
into the current economic climate, and in this sense, we must have an obligatory reference to globali-
zation or better said, all those sets of social relations that cause different phenomena of globalization7.  
9. It is evident that by the end of the 20th century the economic situation had changed. On the 
one hand, we are witnessing the phenomenon of the internationalization of the economy as something 
totally inherent in the normal state of economic operators and, on the other hand, in dominating the idea 
of a free trade environment, that is fundamental to achieve an increase in economic welfare, national 
limitations of proceedings have disappeared or have been mitigated to expand market size. Thus, we are 
helping the well‑known process of economic globalization, which we can say is represented by three 
main concepts; the liberalization of trades in goods markets, the liberalization of capital markets and a 
revolution in communications and computer technology (ICT), and consists of the progressive integra-
tion of the national economy into the international economy, so that its evolution depends increasingly 
on foreign markets and less on internal national politics, with an extremely high mobility of production 
factors (especially capital) that culminates in an ever‑increasing supranational economic integration. 
10. As a result of this economic integration, a growth in the coordination of fiscal politics in 
multijurisdictional structures has been observed, as well as the establishment of supranational bodies 
that protect these policies, it is posed a dilemma in the field of taxation: to what extent is this fact limi-
ting the fiscal sovereignty of countries?  
11. The analysis of the framework of work of states, in the fiscal sphere, entails that each one of 
those is sovereign to demand and adjust taxes levied on the income of its residents. This can be brought 
down to not only taxation of income obtained in the territory of State, but also to even those that can 
earn from foreign territories. 
12. On one hand, the globalization and the absence of the International Tax Authority requires 
an increased coordination and mutual support between the national tax administrations. And on the other 
hand, the tax itself, which remains a matter of national sovereignty and implements the competitive po-
5 r. De la Feria, “EU General Anti‑(Tax) Avoidance Mechanisms: From GAAP to GAAR” in g. loutzenhiser and r. De 
la Feria (Eds.), The Dynamics of Taxation, Oxford Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2020.
6 V. ruiz alMenDral, “El Fraude a la ley tributaria a examen (Los problemas de la aplicación práctica de la norma general 
anti‑fraude del artículo 15 de la LGT a los ámbitos nacional y comunitario)”, Thomson‑Aranzadi, Pamplona, 2006, p. 143.
7 B. De sousa santos, “Por una concepción multicultural de los derechos humanos”, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
México, 1998, pp. 10‑11.
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sition of States, which entails the constant search of preferential tax regimes to attract investment into 
its territory or in tax terms, non‑resident tax bases. 
13. Thus, in the context of rapid growth and mobility, the legislations sometimes remain ob-
solete or suffer significant gaps in the proliferation of situations for which they were not intended; the 
generation of new ways of business and the lack of uniformity between the laws within countries can 
lead to a paradox of which the same acts can be illegal in one country but totally legal in another, so each 
state can establish their policies to influence in the mobile tax bases8, in other words, in those incomes 
or capitals which can relocate themselves offering the best conditions for foreign investment in a race 
to the bottom phenomenon. 
14. It is globalization and the spectacular development of communications that promote and help 
find the new ways of evading taxes9 which taxpayers are searching for by forcing tax legal instruments. 
In the case of the European Union, it is precisely a field where common situations live within a federal 
space (we refer to the UE freedoms of movement of capital and workers, freedom of establishment and 
freedom to provide services) with other more typical relations between fully independent States that have 
also worsened since 2004 by the addition of new countries. This situation has strengthened the fiscal 
competition between States that in the process, presents two distinguished aspects, on one hand, it speaks 
of healthy tax competition (referred to as this by the international doctrine) understood as the process 
of elimination of inefficiencies and the increase in the neutrality in the fiscal systems, executed with the 
intention to prevent the idea that taxation is an obstacle in the development of economic activities10. 
15. The harmful fiscal tax competition appears in direct confrontation with the previous figure 
when the fiscal element is used to attract capital or tax bases. This has caused States to create non‑corpo-
rate establishments with their own tax mechanisms, competing to attract investment projects with a high 
element of competition in terms of tax awards (tax holidays, favourable regulations, etc.)11   
16. Given the premise that we have seen that each state is sovereign to design their tax regime 
and establish their level of tax according to their public finance needs. Harmful tax competition appears 
when unjustified or exorbitant tax advantages appear, that end up being the foundation or at least one of 
the essential foundations in the location of an activity or income12. 
17. Consequently, tax is going to be put between influencing factors at the time of making 
economic‑finance decisions by operators, whose natural consequence is contemplating international 
tax planning as an economic strategy that tries to choose or construct a more efficient route to more 
efficient tax‑action, in other words, that which is among all legal viable alternatives, allows to mini-
mize the tax burden as a part of an economic planning and management of subjects. This on a purely 
competitive level, can become difficult for States to determine the taxable income of taxpayers given 
the leeway they have13, product of the high volume of financial resources likely to being mobilised 
8 J.M. Cantos, “Consideraciones sobre la competencia fiscal en Europa”, in AA.VV. XVII Encuentro de Economía Pública, 
2010.
9 F. serrano antón, “Las medidas antiabuso en los convenios para evitar la doble imposición internacional”, in serrano/
soler (Dirs.), Las medidas anti-abuso en la normativa interna española y en los convenios para evitar la doble imposición 
internacional y su compatibilidad con el Derecho Comunitario, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid, 2002, p. 79.
10 J.M. ValleJo ChaMorro, “La competencia fiscal perniciosa en el seno de la OCDE y la Unión Europea”, in Nuevas ten-
dencias en economía y fiscalidad internacional, nº 825, p. 148.
11 e. WilDasin DaViD, “Fiscal Competition”, IFIR Working Papers, 2005‑05, June 2005, p. 1: the term fiscal competition 
may evoke images of one state pitted in a contest with another for a high-stakes manufacturing project, with politicians serving 
up juicy packages of tax holidays, infrastructure projects, regulatory relief, and direct subsidies to entice a firm and advance 
the cause of economic development, jobs, or other supposedly desirable economic outcomes.
12 J.M. ValleJo ChaMorro, “La competencia fiscal perniciosa en el seno de la OCDE y la Unión Europea”, cit., p. 148.
13 PolloCk and shouP, “The Effect of Shifting the Property Tax Base from Improvement Value to Land Value: An Empirical 
Estimate”, in Land Economics, vol. 53, nº 1, 1977.
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and, also, the diversity of quantitative and qualitative offers that are fiscally attractive to preferential 
regimes. In this sense, the planning moves in a double border: on one hand, it will be understood as 
an economy of options fully lawful and legitimate14 conduct and, secondly, since there will be states 
establishing defence mechanisms that seek to prevent tax erosion derived from tax arbitrage, they will 
be configured as a synonym of circumvention whose defining element lies in being formally secun-
dum legem, but in substance contrary to law; that is, they are illegal to go against the intent of the law 
without being illegitimate in its own meaning. However, exploitation of the differences between tax 
regimes and the consequent tax optimization is not necessarily unlawful, so that even its place in fraud 
schemes in tax law is easy to defend15. 
18. The European Court of Justice has stated, in this respect that the concepts of tax evasion, fis-
cal fraud and abuse of tax legislation differ between Member States. In the United Kingdom, the concept 
of tax avoidance is legal, unlike tax evasion, which is illegal. The lack of a general concept of abuse in 
tax legislation in the UK makes it impossible to establish a common distinction in other Member States 
between abusive tax planning which is illegal, and simple fiscal planning, that despite being particularly 
unpopular for tax administration, is legal16. 
19. So, if the question is what should be legitimate tax planning according to the laws in the 
European Union, it seems clear that the answer to this question should be that all fiscal planning is 
legitimate as long as it is not abusive but, to be able to defend this hypothesis, it is first essential to esta-
blish a detailed criterion to determine when an abuse of rights occurs17. In other words, when we could 
be facing an antisocial exercise of individual rights that has inspired us for no other motive other than 
reducing tax burdens. 
20. It is undeniable that we are in an extremely globalised economic situation, where States 
compete to offer more and better competitive tax options and where the taxpayer has in his favour a 
variety of options that allows him to have more detailed planning. In the framework of the European 
Union, they have declared a series of UE freedoms that have had one purpose, which is simply the 
achievement of the Internal Market and although covered by said liberties, the citizens of the Member 
States can develop their economic interests they cannot deny the legitimate interest that a Member State 
may have in preventing some of its nationals, by means of facilities created under the Treaty, improperly 
circumventing their national legislation18. 
21. Therefore, understanding the concept of abuse of rights is fundamental to understand the 
true extent of the imposed limitations in international fiscal planning and the exercise of the freedoms 
within the European Union involved, because by not doing so, unless a Europe free of boarders coordi-
nates with the harmonisation of taxes on goods and capital, there will be a reorganization of production 
on comparative tax advantage rather than on comparative cost advantage19. 
14 a. MonDini, “Planificación Fiscal y Jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Europea”, Universidad de 
Bolonia, p. 2.
15 V. ruiz alMenDral, “¿Tiene futuro el test de los motivos económicos válidos en las normas antiabuso? (sobre la plani-
ficación fiscal y las normas anti‑abuso en el derecho de la Unión Europea)”, in Revista de Contabilidad y Tributación CEF, nº 
329-330, p. 8.
16 Judgment of 12 july 1988, Direct Cosmetics Ltd and Laughtons Photographs Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Ex-
cise (Joined Cases 138/86 and 139/86) ECLI:EU:C:1988:383, par. 21‑24.
17 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Poiares MaDuro delivered on 7 april 2005, Halifax, Case C-255/02.
18 Judgment of 7 february 1979, Knoors, (Case 115/78) ECLI:EU:C:1979:31, para. 25.
19 s. sinn, “The taming of Leviathan: competition among government”, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee (Ed.), 
Federal expenditure policy for economic growth and stability, Washington D.C., 1992, pp. 213-219.
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2. Terminological and conceptual evolution of abuse of rights in the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice in the European Union: the abuse of freedoms of the European Union 
A) The abuse of law within the European Union 
22. The concept of abuse of law is not novel at European level, and since the sentencing of Van 
Binsbergen20, the Court of Justice of the European Union, without using specifically the term abuse, 
established the first notes of its jurisprudential construction.  
23. This construction, as we have already expressed, has been a process of dialogue between 
their own Court, and the Member States, carried out fundamentally through the national courts through 
preliminary rulings, which resulted in them being raised during the course of respective lawsuits. 
24. It can therefore be said that the concept of abuse is a product of the search for solutions in the 
tension between the interests of the Union and national interests in the tribunal field, between the EU’s 
single market and the tax interests of the States21.  
25. However, it has not been a peaceful dialogue: during the process of constructing the concept, 
a multitude of terms have been used by the Court as if they were interchangeable, synonyms or including 
on certain occasions, elements which are indistinct or lacking their own independent meaning. In this 
regard, in their relative jurisprudence to this question they have used such varied terms such as, avoi-
dance22, fraud23, evasion24 or, in a more generally, they have used the term abusive practices25 reaching 
to assimilate the concept of fraudulent practices26. 
26. NOGUEIRA claims that abuse, evasion, avoidance, fraud, abusive planning, illegitimate 
planning (…) are just some of the terms used to describe those human behaviours which, being carriers 
of a pathological element, are an affront to the normal operation of the tax system27. In addition, the 
Court is asymmetrical in its treatment of the anti‑abuse doctrine, depending on the regulatory context, 
or fundamental freedoms faced with the rules contained in the Directives that are at stake, showing di-
fferent levels of power when judging the analysed conduct28. In the already summoned Sentence of Van 
Binsbergen, the Court is going to establish a starting point to be kept constant in all its pronouncements 
and is none other than the fact that stakeholders cannot take advantage of Law within the European 
Union in an abusive or fraudulent way29. This revealed postulate seems obvious, and it is that they can-
not deny the legitimate interest that a Member State may have in preventing that, taking advantage of the 
facilities created by the Treaty, some of their nationals try to abusively avoid the appliance of their na-
tional rules30, making them unable to gain advantage through abuse or fraudulent conduct31. This comes 
20 Judgment of 3 december 1974, Van Binsbergen (Case C-33/74) ECLI:EU:C:1974:131.
21 r. sanz góMez, “Las cláusulas anti‑abuso específicas tributarias frente a las libertades de circulación de la Unión Euro-
pea”, Bosch Fiscalidad, 2010, p. 63.
22 Van Binsbergen, cit.
23 Direct Cosmetic and Laughtons Photographs Ltd, cit.
24 Judgment of 17 july 1997, Leur-Blomen (Case C-28/95) ECLI:EU:C:1997:369.
25 Judgment of 12 march 1996, Pafitis (Case C-441/93) ECLI:EU:C:1996:92.
26 Judgment of 2 may 1996, Paletta (Case C-206/94) ECLI:EU:C:1996:182, para. 13.
27 J.F.P. nogueira, “Abuso de direito em fiscalidade directa”, in Revista da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade do Porto, 
2010, p. 234.
28 Vid V. ruiz alMenDral: “¿Tiene futuro el test de los motivos económicos válidos en las normas antiabuso?” cit., and r. 
sanz góMez, “Las cláusulas anti‑abuso específicas tributarias frente a las libertades de circulación de la Unión Europea”, cit.
29 Vid. Van Binsbergen, cit., para. 13, Judgment of 5 october 1994, TV10 (Case C-23/93) ECLI:EU:C:1994:362, para. 21, 
Judgment of 10 january 1985, Leclerc (Case 229/83) ECLI:EU:C:1985:1, para. 27 and Judgment of 21 june 1988, Lair (Case 
39/86) ECLI:EU:C:1988:322, para. 43.
30 Knoors, cit., para. 25.
31 Palletta, cit., para. 24.
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from reflecting on the main context in which the Court of Justice has analysed the concept of abuse and 
that is simply to abusively invoke the provisions of European Law, with the aim to obtain advantages in 
a way that disobeys the purposes and objectives of these dispositions. In other words, you cannot deny 
an EU Member State the right to adopt provisions to prevent the freedoms guaranteed by the treaty being 
used for a lender whose activity is entirely or mainly orientated towards their territory, in order to avoid 
the rules that would be applicable if they were established in the territory of that state. 
27. However, the use of the UE freedoms to obtain a given application of a favourable legal 
regime (including tax) is not to be understood by the Court as abusive, instead finding it perfectly legiti-
mate under UE law. This has been stated convincingly when it states that the simple exercise of the UE 
freedoms within the EU, in the search for beneficial legal regimes, cannot be invoked to justify a general 
presumption of abusive practises and serve as justification of measures that go against the practise of a 
fundamental freedom guaranteed by the EU Treaty32.  
28. Therefore, we can state that under the Court, the EU freedoms have become genuine indivi-
dual rights of economic agents operating in the common market, applicable before the states where these 
want to carry out an economic activity or investment in their state of residence33. 
29. In this regard, the EU freedoms make up an essential point of reference to determine the ob-
jective and spirit of anti‑abuse rules established by the EU Member States, it is necessary to understand 
clearly and concisely that the fundamental objective is constructing an internal market, therefore the in-
tegration of legal systems in the EU Member States have a requirement to eliminate or at least diminish 
the legal barriers that hinder or impede their achievements. The freedoms mentioned above, are access 
rights to the market and cannot be constituted as abuse when they are practised in a given search context 
for more beneficial legal or tax regimes34. 
30. Nevertheless, this statement does not solely constitute as a useful instrument for explaining 
if a right arising from a specific regulation in UE Law can be exploited abusively. For it to be functional, 
a criterion or a detailed doctrine are required to determine when an abuse occurs. We must bear in mind 
that, in this context, hopefully the relationship between national anti‑abuse rules and EU Law in the 
European Court of Justice maintains the same position in all fields. Therefore, in the case of a conflict, 
it will be necessary to ensure the basic principle runs through its jurisprudence, in other words, the unity 
of UE Law and its interpretation and application should be standardized35. 
31. Therefore, it is fundamental to determine what is the primarily affected right to observe, 
given the circumstances of each case36. 
32. Given the previous considerations, it is crucial to analyse the doctrine of the Court advancing 
to the first conceptual reference in the sentencing of Van Binbergen, in the field of freedom to provide 
services, in which the Court confirms that one cannot deny a Member State the right to adopt regulations 
aimed at preventing the practice of freedoms being used for a lender whose activity is completely, or 
mainly, orientated towards their territory, to avoid the professional rules that would be applicable if they 
32 Judgment of 26 september 2000, Commission/Belgium (Case C‑ 478/98) ECLI:EU:C:2000:497, para. 45; Judgment of 21 
november 2001, X e Y (Case C‑436/00) ECLI:EU:C:2002:704, para. 62; Judgment of 4 march 2004, Commission/France (Case 
C‑334/02) ECLI:EU:C:2004:129, para. 27 and Judgment of 12 september 2006, Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes 
Overseas (Case C-196/04) ECLI:EU:C:2006:544 para. 50.
33 a. Martín JiMénez, “A Globalización y derecho tributario: el impacto del derecho comunitario sobre las cláusulas anti‑
elusión/anti‑abuso del derecho interno”, in Documentos del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, nº 7/07, 2007, p. 6.
34 In this sense, V. ruiz alMenDral “¿Tiene futuro el test de los motivos económicos válidos en las normas antiabuso?”, cit.
35 a. Martín JiMénez, “Globalización y derecho tributario: el impacto del derecho comunitario sobre las cláusulas anti‑
elusión/anti‑abuso del derecho interno”, cit., p. 7.
36 Opinion of Mr Advocate tesauro delivered on 23 september 1997, Safir, Case C-118/96, para. 9.
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were established in the territory of that state. Without ever using the term abuse, the court makes it clear 
that the avoidance (although the term that is used in the original version of the sentencing is to avoid37) 
of the national professional rules through an artificial appeal or anomaly of the fundamental freedoms 
would not be acceptable in law38. This sentence, regardless of the decision itself, reflects the first case in 
which the Court considers the U‑turn transactions and cases of Circumvention as alleged abuse of UE 
Law, tackling the problem of practice of UE freedoms with the aim to avoid the EU Member States rules 
hoping for the implementation of more beneficial laws. 
33. So, we come to establish imposing specific requirements to a subject that cannot be conside-
red incompatible with the Treaty (in this case; professional service providers) that are motivated to apply 
justified professional rules for the general interest that will apply to any person established in the territory 
of the State where they expect to carry out the benefit, to the extent that the service provider would be 
free from completing these rules due to the circumstances of being established in another member State39. 
34. However, the Court will thereafter conclude and confirm that when an occupation that has a 
completely free regime inside an EU Member State is concerned, the requirements to become a resident 
within that Member State constitute as a restriction that is incompatible with the Treaty. As long as it can 
meet the required needs of the State of destination, where the practice of professional service providers 
is concerned, through the use of less stringent measures. Consequently, it cannot prevent the service 
providers for people settled within another Member State, imposing a permanent residence request in 
a certain area, when the national law does not subject the service provider to any special requirements, 
declaring the suppression of all discriminations imposed due to nationality or residency. 
35. As we can see, the Court from the start is going to leave various clear, defined, and basic as-
pects that will be held in the following pronouncements. On the one hand, it will not allow UE freedoms 
to be used abusively with elusive outcomes. Nonetheless, it will prevent the existence of restrictions or 
discriminations in the proper practice of freedoms imposing limits on the national anti‑abusive measu-
res. Hence, when facing the slightest doubt in the alleged analysed fact, the reaction of the Court will be 
extremely restrictive when ruling the existence of a possible misuse of rights. 
B) The abuse of law in its application of EU Freedoms 
36. As already mentioned in the previous section, regarding the practice of the freedom to pro-
vide services, the Court, in Van Binsbergen, has set a starting point in its construction of the concept of 
Legal abuse to confirm that the stakeholders cannot rely on UE Law fraudulently or abusively, although 
they restrict the law by admitting that the search for a more beneficial legal system cannot invoke to jus-
tify a general presumption of abusive practises and to serve the justification of measures that go against 
the practice of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty. 
37. Where the free movement of goods is concerned, the Court, in the judgement of Lecrerc, 
will use the literal term ‘circumvention’ in their concept of abusive conduct. If we pay attention to its 
37 Likewise, a Member State cannot be denied the right to take measures to prevent the exercise by a person providing 
services whose activity is entirely or principally directed towards its territory of the freedom guaranteed by Article 59 for the 
purpose of avoiding the professional rules of conduct which would be applicable to him if he were established within that State.
38 Judgment of 26 november 1975, Coenen (Case C-39/75) ECLI:EU:C:1975:162: (…) Although, in the light of the special 
nature of certain services, it cannot be denied that a member state is entitled to adopt measures which are intended to prevent 
the freedom guaranteed by article 59 being used by a person whose activities are entirely or chiefly directed towards his terri-
tory in order to avoid the professional rules which would apply to him if he resided in that state, the requirement of residence 
in the territory of the state where the service is provided can only be allowed as an exception where the member state is unable 
to apply other, less restrictive, measures to ensure respect for these rules (para. 9).
39 Van Binbergen, cit., para. 12.
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definition, we can see that it is further reiterated in the reference for the term ‘evasion’40, as a configuring 
element of abuse of rights or to be more exact, in the context of analysing the precept, the configuration 
of the abuse of UE freedoms to achieve the application of a particular legal system. In this judgement, 
where the interpretation of different rules within the UE Law is analysed, particularly, the free competi-
tion in the common market with the aim to be able to assess the compatibility of one national regulation 
that imposes to all retailers the idea of a fixed price for the editor or the importer for the sale of books, 
the Court is going to pronounce confirming that it is not prohibited for Member States to adopt a similar 
legislation. Provided that this legislation respects other specific precepts in the Treaty, especially those 
that refer to the free movement of goods. 
38. However, in this case, they constitute as measures that have similar effect to quantitative 
restrictions on imports that are prohibited by the Treaty. Those measures imposing the policy of prices 
for the sales of reimported books after having been previously exported to another Member State, ex-
cept if there is objective information that confirms that these exported books were solely reimported to 
avoid the legislation. As we can see, the Court again stresses the protection of UE freedom in the debate 
excluding the exclusive case that objectively may exist; information that leads to the conclusion of the 
existence of abuse41.  
39. In matters of the free movement of workers, the Court rules in the same line of argument, 
how we can extract the reasons set out in the judgement of Lair42, whose argument is based on the con-
cern of preventing certain abuses that could present themselves when there is objective data in the sense 
that a practice of freedoms exists with only one intention of accepting, through a brief period of activity, 
a certain aid system43.  
40. The Advocate General TRSTENJAK44 has stated in the same way, that in the cases where 
concrete evidence of abuse of Law exists, we must exclude the possibility of accepting it as Rights of the 
European Union and as the Court of Justice exposed in the judgement of Commission/Spain45, in relation 
with the interpretation of the Directive 89/48, the nationals of a Member State cannot take advantage of 
the possibilities created by the UE Law or try to abusively avoid the application of its national legislations. 
41. Nevertheless, the Advocate General POIARES MADURO46 states that one cannot conclude 
that an abuse of the Law exists when an EU citizen wanted to take advantage of a profession in another 
more advantageous Member State than that that he studied in.  
42. TRSTENJAK will conclude stating that, depending on the principles of this jurisprudence, 
all EU citizens are permitted to practice their rights of free circulation. To guarantee that this occurs, it 
also corresponds with one of the objectives expressed in the first recital of the Directive 89/48: to abo-
lish, between the Member States the obstacles of the free movement of people. Therefore, the question 
cannot be analysed if we are effectively facing a case of abuse of rights in the abstract, without consi-
dering the objectives of the Directive and will only be able to appreciate its existence when the citizens 
have not effectively or objectively practised their rights of free circulation. 
40 Definitions verb (tr) to evade or go around; to outwit; to encircle (an enemy) so as to intercept or capture.
41 Judgment of 21 september 1983, Deutsche Milchkontor and others (Joined Cases 205/82 to 215/82) ECLI:EU:C:1983:233; 
Judgment of 15 may 1986, Johnston (Case 222/84) ECLI:EU:C:1986:206; Judgment of 8 february 1996, FMC and others 
(Case C‑212/94) ECLI:EU:C:1996:40; and Judgment of 15 june 2000, Arco Chemie Nederland and others (Joined Cases 
C-418/97 and C-419/97) ECLI:EU:C:2000:318.
42 Lair, cit.
43 We find a similar line of argument in Judgment of 23 march 1982, Levin (Case C‑53/81) ECLI:EU:C:1982:105; Judg-
ment of 27 march 1985, Hoeckx (Case C‑249/83) ECLI:EU:C:1985:139; Judgment of 3 june 1986, Kempft (Case C-139/85) 
ECLI:EU:C:1986:223 and Judgment of 3 march 1993, General Milk Products (Case C-8/92) ECLI:EU:C:1993:82.
44 Opinion of Mr Advocate trstenJak, delivered on 2 june 2010, Koller, Case C-118/09.
45 Judgment of 3 october 2008, Commission/Spain (Case C-286/06) ECLI:EU:C:2008:586, para. 55.
46 Opinion delivered on 28 february 2008, Cavallera, Case C-311/06.
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43. Despite this, the Court is going to go one step further in configuring the concept of abuse 
including those with similarities to the term ‘fraud’ using the construction abuse of fraudulent conduct 
to qualify the prosecuted conduct, breaking a classic distinction between both legal concepts47. 
44. In the Paletta II48 case, in which they argue over the validity of a certificate issued by a me-
dical authority of a Member State (Italy), that grants economic benefits to posted workers for businesses 
from another State (Germany), the German national court observes that in practice the certificate attes-
ting their incapacity to work, does not always correspond to reality, especially when they understand that 
they have been abusively issued or obtained. Bearing this observation in mind, the Bundesarbeitsgericht 
develops a line with case law in which, there is an understanding that abuse exists, an entrepreneur can 
contest the sincerity of the medical documents that at first show that one is unable to work, usually in a 
cross‑border basis, meaning that the worker should bring additional proof in support of the authenticity 
of their inability to work. Whilst analysing the case the Court starts to establish, basing it on objective 
elements, that the national legal systems may consider the stakeholder´s abusive or fraudulent beha-
viour, and in their case, to refuse them the benefits of the regulations invoked in UE Law. 
45. However, the application of the jurisprudence mentioned by the national legal system, dicta-
tes that the worker must provide additional tests to support the authenticity of their inability to work by 
providing a medical certificate. If when the company invokes and tests the mitigating circumstances that 
allow serious doubt on the worker’s alleged inability to work which happens unexpectedly in a Member 
State that differs from the competent Member State, and it does not comply with the legal system, the 
worker would create testing difficulties that the UE regulations were originally aimed at eliminating, as 
it is not proportionate for the difficulty that it entails. 
46. Therefore, in this important pronouncement, the Court confirms that this conduct becomes 
abusive (or fraudulent) when it can demonstrate itself in such a way based on objective elements; up to 
now, this approach does not cause any major novelty; however, to determine reliably that such conduct 
exists, means that they must take into account three essential elements: firstly, that abusive behaviour 
carried out by investors can be determined objectively; secondly, the aims or objectives intended by the 
analysed rules, and thirdly, the proportionality in the burden of proof (or procedural element). 
47. To be able to determine the existence of an abusive behaviour the same person based on the 
objective data must demonstrate their existence, using the UE freedoms to obtain a more beneficial legal 
regime than the one which was evaded; symmetrically, to determine the abuse of a certain rule, the aim 
or objective must be known, in a way that can rationally conclude that the alleged abusive behaviour 
effectively moves away from the aim intended by the evaded rule, and lastly, the demand of testing in 
the way in which the behaviour declared as abusive is protected must be provided and congruent with 
the UE legal system.  
48. Consequently, the position of the Court is reiterated when it seamlessly confirms, that the 
use of UE freedoms to obtain a certain legal status or the application of a more beneficial regime, will 
automatically not be considered as abuse. 
47 In Spanish doctrine, the expression fraud of law is used to refer also to the concepts of circumvention or abuse of the 
norm, although this term is modified with the wording of article 15 given in the General Tax Law of 2003, referring to the ex-
pression Conflict in the application of the tax regulation: Article 15. Conflict in the application of the tax regulation.1. It will be 
understood that there is a conflict in the application of the tax rule when the realization of the taxable event is totally or partially 
avoided or the tax base or debt is reduced through acts or businesses in which the following circumstances concur: a) That, 
individually considered or as a whole, are notoriously artificial or inappropriate for the achievement of the result obtained. b) 
That their use does not result in relevant legal or economic effects, other than tax savings and the effects that would have been 
obtained with the usual or own acts or businesses.  
48 Judgment of 2 may 1996, Paletta II (Case C-206/94) ECLI:EU:C:1996:182.
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49. And it is clear that the conclusion that can be extracted from the present rulings is that the 
citizens of the Member States are permitted to carry out their rights and freedoms that the UE legal 
system49 grants them, choosing the regime that will be the most beneficial, without a priori, such beha-
viour could be considered as abusive. It is essential that another defining element be added to the legal 
construction of the concept that defines abuse of rights, providing it with a material content that allows 
us to distinguish when we are facing an abusive practice of EU freedoms to obtain the circumvention of 
a certain detrimental legal regime.  This element will be defined by the Court in their different rulings in 
matters related to the freedom of establishment.  
50. The Court of Justice has confirmed repeatedly that the concept of establishment is very 
broad and implies the possibility that a UE citizen has a stable and continuous participation in the eco-
nomic life of a Member State that is different to the State of origin, benefitting itself and encouraging the 
economic and social integration in respect of self‑employed activities within the UE50. 
51. Additionally, the freedom of establishment operates in a dual sense: on one hand, ensuring 
that whichever national of a Member State (whether it’s an individual or a legal entity) enjoys the na-
tional treatment in the hosting State and on the other hand, ensuring that the State of origin does not 
obstruct one of its nationals or a company incorporated under its legislation51 in the hosting State. The-
refore, in respect to the freedom of establishment it’s going to limit both the policy‑making capacity in 
the State of origin, as well as the policy‑making capacity of the State of establishment. In this regard, this 
freedom has become fundamental in the construction of the jurisprudence, in matters of abuse of rights 
by the Court of Justice, as it has been about to remain patent in renowned judgements such as Cadbury 
Schweppes52 or Marks & Spencer53, amongst many others. 
52. One of the first complete definitions of the concept of establishment carried out by the Court 
we will find in its literal form in the Judgment of Factortame II54, in which it is noteworthy that the con-
cept of establishment involves the effective practice of an economic activity by means of a permanent 
installation in another Member State for an indeterminate duration. From this definition we can extract 
that the court understands that it is imperative in order for a real establishment of a Member State to 
exist, that they require a convergence of firstly, the effective and real development of an economic ac-
tivity that is developed with sufficient material means and secondly, that it is developed in an indefinite 
amount of time, although this last requirement is arguable with regards to whether the indefinite amount 
of time is extensive enough to not be considered sporadic. 
53. To give the answer to this argument the Advocate General DARMON, in his presented con-
clusions55 in the Daily Mail case, confirmed that to understand that a real establishment exists they must 
have practiced an economic activity with character, which if not permanent, was at least long‑lasting.  
54. However, this stance has various nuances in the jurisprudence of the Court: in Centros56, a 
newspaper whose main objective centres in a danish marriage, and resides in Denmark, that decides to 
carry out business activities in the Danish State operating as an English private limited company and fully 
subjected to English Law, with the intention to avoid the application of rules on minimum capital requi-
rements in Danish Law. Because of this, and although both the effective direction of their principal place 
49 J. laBeaga azCona, “La adaptación de la regulación del derecho tributario general al Ordenamiento comunitario, Co-
misión para el estudio de la adaptación del derecho tributario al comunitario”, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid, 2011.
50 Judgment of 21june 1974, Reyners (Case 2/74) ECLI:EU:C:1974:68.
51 Judgment of 16 july 1998, ICI (Case C-264/96) CLI:EU:C:1998:370, para. 21.
52 Judgment of 12 september 2006, Cadbury Schweppes PLC (Case C-196/04) ECLI:EU:C:1998:370.
53 Judgment of 13 december 2005, Marks & Spencer (Case C-446/03) ECLI:EU:C:2005:763.
54 Judgment of 25 july 1991, Factortame II and others (Case C-221/89) ECLI:EU:C:1991:320.
55 Opinion delivered on 7 june 1988, Daily Mail, Case 81/87.
56 Judgment of 9 march 1999, Centros (Case C-212/97) ECLI:EU:C:1999:126.
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of business of said company took place in Denmark, the shareholders preferred to operate under a private 
limited company subjected to British Law and with their registered office in England. The litigation arose 
when requesting the registration of a branch of said company in Denmark (a branch that, in fact, was going 
to be the main establishment of the company since the effective direction of the company and its principal 
place of business is centred there). The Danish authorities refuse this application for registration using the 
main argument that the company interested has their centre of economic activities in Denmark, without 
carrying out any economic activity in the United Kingdom and their only intention in constituting as a 
company under British Law, is to evade the relative Danish regulations to limited reliability companies.  
55. The Court, in its decision, proceeds to point out that freedom of establishment conferred 
by Article 52 of the Treaty to UE nationals includes the right to take up and pursue activities as self‑
employed persons, as well as when administrating and setting up companies in the same conditions as 
those defined by the State legislation for its own nationals; moreover, article 58 of the Treaty, equips 
individuals, nationals of Member States, companies constituted in accordance with the law of a Mem-
ber State and whose head office, central administration is found in the European Union. It continues to 
affirm the fact that a national of a Member State that wants to create a company, choses to from it in 
another Member State whose regulations on rights of companies seem less harsh and open up branches 
in other Member States and cannot constitute as an abuse of establishment rights. In effect, the rights of 
forming a company in accordance with the Member State´s legislations and creating branches in other 
Member States is inherent in the exercise of established freedoms that are guaranteed by the Treaty 
within a unique market, without requiring the first stage of protection of the freedoms analysed.  
56. This argument maintains the same position that was sustained in the Segers57 case, emphasi-
sing that the national provisions from which stakeholders have sought to avoid, are rules governing the 
formation of companies and not rules concerning the exercise of certain activities.  
57. Moreover, the provisions of the Treaty relating to the freedoms of establishment have a 
purpose precisely to allow companies incorporated under the Member States legislations and whose 
head office, central administration and principal place of business is found within the European Union, 
practiced through an agency, branch or subsidiary activities in other Member States. 
58. The fact that a company does not practice any activity in the Member State where it has its 
registered office and develops its activities solely in a Member State of one of its branches is not enough 
to demonstrate the existence of an abusive and fraudulent behaviour.  
59. Because of this, it will end up deciding that the UE system is quite clear in relation to com-
panies that can benefit from the freedoms of establishment constituted in accordance with the legislation 
of a Member State and whose head office or principal place of business is found within the European 
Union, denying that the behaviour in question is abusive: its inherent to an integrated European market, 
where each state has their own system, that the operators chose the one that suits them best58. 
60. However, this interpretation does not exclude the authorities of the affected Member State 
from adopting whichever appropriate measures to prevent or sanction fraud when they can demonstrate 
that, what they want from the formation of a company is to evade their obligations towards private or 
public creditors established in the territory of the affected Member State. 
57 Judgment of 10 july 1986, Segers (Case 79/85) ECLI:EU:C:1986:308, para. 13 (…) the right of establishment includes 
pursuant to article 58 of the eec treaty, the right of companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a member state 
and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the community to pursue their 
activities in another member state through an agency, branch or subsidiary. With regard to companies , it should be noted that 
it is their registered office in the abovementioned sense that serves as the connecting factor with the legal system of a particular 
state , as does nationality in the case of natural persons.
58 Segers, cit.
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61. Effectively, the fact that the Court understands contrary to law, the non‑recognition of the 
constitution of a company under the terms set forth in Centros, it does not prevent it arguing that, the so-
ciety itself could constitute a wholly artificial arrangement, and also, an abusive practice of the freedom 
of establishment, because as they try to support the ECJ rulings on the discern between the freedom of 
establishment and the effective realization of a real and valid economic object in a first level of protec-
tion, it would enter in a second area of analysis. 
62. In this regard, the judgement of Cadburys Schweppes is of upmost importance, and for that 
matter, the conclusions presented by the Advocate General LÉGER59. In this sentence, the Court will 
convincingly confirm that in order for a restriction on freedoms of establishment to be justified by moti-
ves in the fight against abusive practices, the specific objective of such a restriction must be opposing to 
consistent behaviours in creating purely artificial arrangements, of which do not reflect economic reality, 
and which have the objective to evade taxes normally owed by the activities that the shareholder carries 
out in their State of origin, also seeking to equate the activities which do not reflect economic activity 
such as letterbox or front subsidiaries60.  
63. In a logical conclusion from the Court’s arguments, it appears clearly and convincingly that 
the UE citizens cannot take advantage of or justify themselves in geographic mobility that guarantees 
them the provisions of UE rights with the sole intention of evading their respective national tax regimes. 
This would constitute as the abusive use of the rights of establishment that would justify restrictive mea-
sures on behalf of the national governments who aim to eliminate possible tax evasion61. 
64. To define the expression wholly artificial arrangement will be, without a doubt, the essential 
requirement to distinguish when the stakeholder is using the practice of freedoms of establishment abu-
sively. For this, the Advocate General LEGER considered a test based on three fundamental elements 
that would serve to distinguish the wholly artificial arrangements from those arrangements which aren´t. 
65. Firstly, it deals with the degree of physical presence of the subsidiary in the host State, se-
condly, the genuine nature of the activity provided by the subsidiary and, finally, the economic value of 
that activity to the parent company and the entire group, although the development of this test will be 
dealt with in depth in the next chapter of this work.  
66. Therefore, from the perspective of the practice of UE freedoms, the case‑law of the concept 
of abuse of law has been based until now and almost exclusively, on determining which circumstances 
UE freedoms can be considered as being used to obtain a more beneficial legal regime than the evaded, 
using for it artificial or anomalous resources for the fundamental freedoms without establishing a clear 
conceptual structure due to the synonyms that are used to define prosecuted behaviour.  
67. The court exclusively focuses on determining that the practice of a right conferred by the 
European Union will be abusive when it´s used irrationally with the intention of obtaining illegitimate 
profits62 and that the UE legislation cannot extend to reach and cover abusive practices by economic 
operators63. 
59 Opinion delivered on 2 may 2006, Cadbury Schweppes, Case C-196/04.
60 Judgment of 2 may 2006, Eurofood (Case C‑341/04) ECLI:EU:C:2006:190, paras. 34 y 35.
61 J.M. iglesias Casais, “No discriminación fiscal y derecho de establecimiento en la Unión Europea”, Thomson‑Aranzadi, 
Navarra, 2007, p. 223.
62 l. De Broe, “International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse”, IBFD, Amsterdam, 2008, p. 754.
63 Judgment of 11 october 1977, Cremer (Case 125/76) ECLI:EU:C:1977:148, para. 21: further, it appears from the answers 
to the second and third questions that the scope of Regulation No 166/64 and Regulation No 171/64 must in no case be extended 
to cover abusive practices of an exporter in taking advantage of the flat-rate assessment in calculating the refunds especially 
as at the time it was not a question of adopting a comprehensive set of rules but only of creating a frame-work within which the 
national authorities were to regulate the market for the products in question at their own discretion.
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68. In conclusion, it can be confirmed that even though in the context of the practice of UE 
freedoms studied up until now, the concept of abuse the Court of Justice constructed does not differ in 
excess from the general concepts existing in the different national legal systems in the Member States, 
the threshold requirement in its application that the Court has structured is without any doubt, much 
higher than that proposed by the Member States. This which is explained by the Court is a guarantor of 
the UE freedoms and is a direct consequence of the existence of clear competition between states, for it 
not to exist, or for harmonized rules to exist, could possibly bring the eradication of forced operations 
that are nothing but the natural practice of UE freedoms. 
3. Synthesis of the evolution of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in the European Union 
69. As we have been able to confirm, the jurisprudence sustained by the Court in most of its jud-
gements, seems to solely admit those anti‑abuse rules whose aim is to dismantle artificial or abnormal 
behaviours without real economic substance, that have been plotted to obtain an advantage or benefit 
that had not existed without this abusive behaviour and that with respect to the effected analysis of the 
practice of UE freedoms, no abuse is made. Therefore, it is undeniable that all anti-abuse rules must 
determine a connection between the intended purpose of the circumvented rule and that pursued by 
whoever exercises their right aimed at obtaining a benefit or advantage. From what has been studied un-
til now, we can conclude that, in general, two main stages can be seen in the jurisprudence of the Court 
of Justice in the European Union in the construction of the concept. 
70. Firstly, the Court systematically recognises that the rights that the UE legal system confers can-
not be used abusively by using different terms for them that although can bring confusion for their different 
content, when properly contextualized become synonyms of the same misuse of the UE legal system. 
71. Because of this, it is set that UE freedoms cannot be used in an abusive (or fraudulent, evasive, 
elusive, or in terms of circumvention) way to obtain a certain more beneficial legal regime than that eva-
ded, using artificial or abnormal resources. In accordance with this, the Court extends that the assessment 
of the existence of abuse demands the interpretation of UE Law, since they could never be considered as 
abusive behaviours that form part of the essential content of the recognised laws by the UE Law subjects64. 
72. To determine the existence of an abusive behaviour, it must be legitimate and be covered by 
UE provisions, but that, in essence, strays from the purpose or the real objective of the provision that 
covers the behaviour facing the circumvented rule using it for abnormal or artificial resources in the 
practices of fundamental freedoms.  
73. Subsequently, the construction of the concept of abuse of rights by the Court will reach 
towards the first finished formulation, or, in other words, the first test of abuse that will require the con-
currence of certain elements in order to condemn the existence of an abusive behaviour. A verifiable ele-
ment, formally legitimate and that is covered by the UE provisions, but that essentially strays from the 
purpose or the real objective of the provisions that protect the behaviour facing the circumvented rule; 
that in conclusion, requires the proof that these conditions have created artificially and have a purpose 
different to that envisaged by the rules.  
74. This will require an analysis to be made case by case, both in the meaning and intended 
purpose of UE law and the behaviour of prudent operators that manage its affairs in compliance with 
legal standards and in accordance with the current commercial and economic practices in force in the 
sector concerned. 
64 a. Martín JiMénez, “Globalización y derecho tributario: el impacto del derecho comunitario sobre las cláusulas anti‑
elusión/anti‑abuso del derecho interno”, cit., p. 9.
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75. A subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain an advantage from the UE rules 
by intentionally creating conditions to obtain it. Requiring the fact that the de facto operation or formu-
lation that has been carried out essentially to obtain a benefit incompatible with the UE Rules. A proce-
dural element relative to the burden of proof, that would correspond to the national administration and 
that must respect, at all times, the criterion of proportionality although, in more serious cases it may be 
permitted an investment of its own load. The inexistence of an anti‑abuse UE rule means that they can 
be the general clauses of the regulations of the Member States may apply in the judgements of the fore-
seeable abusive behaviours, although, to consider them in this way, they must be absolutely compatible 
with their own UE system and the practice of the fundamental freedoms, in a clear consequence of the 
primary principal and the direct effects of it. 
III. The jurisprudential doctrine on the abuse of rights on tax matters 
1. UE measures against abusive practices regarding tax  
76. We have discussed in this work up until now, the general policy that the European Court of 
Justice follows in the construction of their doctrine on anti‑abuse matters, particularly referring to the 
practice of UE freedoms. However, it is necessary to continue the analysis, with the risk of repeating 
some arguments already mentioned, by briefly examining the UE anti‑circumvention policy on tax mat-
ters which was implemented a few years ago with the purpose of later examining the ECJ doctrine on 
this practice of freedom of establishment. 
77. In this sense, having also already insisted on the fight against harmful tax competition, in 
a Commission Communication in 200165, it warned that the European Union must focus particularly 
on the practical problems for the individuals and companies that operate inside the Interior market and 
without a doubt this task should be accompanied by measures that help the Member States to fight aga-
inst fraud and tax evasion. It cannot accept double taxation due simply to the cross‑border nature of the 
economic activity, but by eliminating it, it must not create possibilities of tax avoidance.  
78. The Commission66 is going to outline some ways of coordination and cooperation between 
Member States which in recent years could afford to reach their objectives in tax matters and protect 
their tax bases, also fulfilling their obligations that are set out under the Treaty and guaranteeing the 
elimination of double taxation. 
79. In this regard, and in respect to the application of the provisions against tax avoidance, it 
considers that derived from the case law of the European Court of Justice its necessary to find the right 
balance between the public interest of combatting abusive practices and the necessity to avoid an exa-
ggerated restriction of cross‑border activities inside the European Union, effectively coordinating the 
application of anti‑abuse measures in order to protect the fiscal interests of the Member States practi-
ces67. In this way and given that the actions against the abusive practices cover a wide range of provi-
sions, measures and practices, some Member States apply a generic notion of anti‑abuse practise based 
on the legislation or development of the jurisprudence, whilst others apply more specific provisions, 
such as those relative to controlled foreign societies or the undercapitalisation, destined to protect the 
national tax base against some kinds of more specific types of erosion. 
65 Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament and The Economic and Social Commit-
tee, Tax Policy in the European Union ‑ Priorities for the years ahead, COM (2001) 260 final, Brussels, 23.05.2001.
66 Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament and The Economic and Social Com-
mittee, Co‑ordinating Member States’ direct tax systems in the Internal Market, COM (2006) 823 final, Brussels, 19.12.2006.
67 Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament and The Economic and Social Com-
mittee, The application of anti‑abuse measures in the area of direct taxation – within the EU and in relation to third countries, 
COM (2007) 785 final, Brussels, 10.12.2007.
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80. Specific rules and regulations also exist against abusive practices, such as those that prevent 
the application of the credit method facing the exemption method in certain cross‑border situations or 
those specifically directed at the passive investment in other countries68.  
81. Many Member States enforce in this scope a combination of general and specific provisions, 
this is because the secondary legislation from the European Union does not contain proper anti‑abuse 
laws but what they do provide is the authorization to Member States for them to develop and enforce 
these types of regulations in specific assumptions in a way which the Directives form the compatibility 
standards with them69.  
82. In this policy, it has been the Directives that harmonise certain aspects of tax matters of which 
contain certain generic mechanisms for action against abuse of profits and rights contained in the legis-
lation such as, for example in direct tax matters, the Directive 90/434/CEE on 23rd July 199070, relating 
to the common system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of 
shares between companies in different Member States. It provides, in its article 11.1, the possibility to 
deny tax benefits to those operations whose main objective is to commit a fraud or evade taxes like what 
is available in the Directive 90/435/CEE of 23rd July 1990, relating to common system of taxation appli-
cable to the parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States in their article 1.2. 
83. On the other hand, Directive 2003/48 CE of 3rd June 200371 on taxation of savings income 
in the form of interest payments that, although does not contain any prediction on matters of abuse in 
its recital 3 stating that in accordance with Article 58 paragraph 3 of the Treaty, the provisions of tax 
law of Member States to combat fraud or abuse must not form a means of arbitrary discrimination nor a 
disguised restriction on the free movement of capital and payments defined in Article 56 of the Treaty. 
84. Directive 2003/49/CE of 3rd June 2003 relating to the common system of taxation applicable 
to interest and royalty payments between associates from different Member States, that collect diverse 
anti‑abuse measures such as the contents in article 1.4, relating to the clause of the beneficial owner and 
article 1.10, relating to the minimum period of stay. And lastly, mentions their article 4 that establishes 
certain causes for exclusion of payments as interest or royalties and in article 5 that contains a specific 
clause on matters of abuse. 
85. On 28th January 2016, the Commission presented its proposal for an Anti‑Tax Avoidance Di-
rective as part of the Anti‑Tax Avoidance Package. On 20th June 2016, the Council adopted the Directive 
(EU) 2016/1164 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning 
of the internal market. In order to provide for a comprehensive framework of anti‑abuse measures the 
Commission presented its proposal on 25th October 2016, to complement the existing rule on hybrid 
mismatches. The rule on hybrid mismatches aims to prevent companies from exploiting national mis-
matches to avoid taxation. In addition to the proposal the Commission also published its Staff Working 
68 For example, Until the adoption of Law 540 of 29 April 2015, no general statutory rule to combat abuse existed in Den-
mark. However, case‑law developed the ‘reality’ principle, under which taxation must be determined on the basis of a specific 
assessment of the facts. This means in particular that artificial tax arrangements may, depending on the circumstances, be set 
aside so that taxation takes account of reality, under the principle of substance over form. Case‑law has also developed the 
‘rightful income recipient’ (rette indkomstmodtager) principle. This principle is based on the fundamental provisions relating to 
taxation of income, set out in Paragraph 4 of the statsskatteloven (Law on State tax), which have the effect that the tax author-
ities are not obliged to accept an artificial separation between the income‑generating undertaking or activity and the allocation 
of the income deriving therefrom. This principle is therefore intended to determine the person who — regardless of formal 
appearances — is the real recipient of certain income and thus the person who is liable for tax on it.
69 F.a. garCia Prats, “Las medidas tributarias anti‑abuso y el derecho comunitario”, in serrano/soler (Dirs.), Las medi-
das anti-abuso en la normativa interna española y en los convenios para evitar la doble imposición internacional y su compa-
tibilidad con el Derecho Comunitario, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid, 2002, p. 185.
70 DO L 225, 20 august 1990.
71 DO L 157, 26 june 2003.
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Document. The Anti‑Tax Avoidance Directive contains five legally binding anti‑abuse measures, which 
all Member States should apply against common forms of aggressive tax planning. 
86. With everything from the analysis of anti‑abuse rules contained in the Directives it can be 
concluded that aim to define the application of national anti‑abuse provisions, anticipating that they can-
not practice the laws and profits contained within them when their practice, apart from being the stan-
dard objective, is to carry out their practice with abusive intent, collecting this idea in the doctrine of the 
Court expressed in such important matters, in these effects such as Halifax72 or Cadbury73, authorising 
these national rules that continue to avoid purely artificial arrangements or that restrict the abusive use 
of UE freedoms, as we will conclude further on in this work.  
2. The fight against abusive practices such as justification of tax discriminatory or restriction of 
freedom of establishment rules 
87. As we have had the opportunity to confirm the fact that investors cannot take advantage of UE 
rights abusively or fraudulently, constitutes an axiom that the Court of Justice of the European Union has 
maintained in all its declarations. A contrario sensu, the simple practice of UE freedoms in the search for 
beneficial legal regimes cannot invoke to justify a general presumption of abusive practices and serve as 
justification as measures that go against the practice of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty, 
in which the balance between the practices of rights derived from the UE system and, especially against 
abuse of fundamental freedoms, form the core of the abuse doctrine of the Law of the Court. 
88. The Member States must reach their objectives in fiscal matters and with the aim of protec-
ting their tax revenues, may resort to the application of anti‑abuse measures to prevent erosion through 
the practice by stakeholders, whose freedoms and rights are protected under the Treaty of the European 
Union. Moreover, the need to preserve the balance in the distribution of the Court´s power between 
Member States may also serve to defend the validity of internal fiscal regulations against abusive practi-
ces that search to protect national tax bases against those behaviours of the subjects that could cause its 
erosion, or a transfer of them towards other more advantageous tax jurisdictions.74  
89. However, it must always be done by fulfilling the obligations under the Treaty and guaran-
teeing the compatibility of their national rules with the UE system, these anti‑abuse measures configure 
as specific legal propositions that in certain assumptions apply a specifically more onerous regime, with 
the objective to avoid or make tax avoidance less appealing75 could eventually produce a restriction on 
some of the UE freedoms or a situation of discrimination. 
90. Effectively, the application of the anti‑circumvention rules may lead us to the existence of an 
obstacle to the effective attainment of the internal market and therefore, on the basis that UE freedoms 
constitute as an essential point of reference in its construction, while they configure as access rights to 
it, there is no doubt that the more they expect to avoid abusive conduct, they may constitute an obstacle 
to market access. 
91. In this sense, and in respect to the application of the provisions against tax avoidance, one of 
the mechanisms for analysing the admissibility of national anti‑abuse tax rules against the free practice 
72 Judgment of 21 february 2006, Halifax (Case C255/02) ECLI:EU:C:2006:121.
73 Cadbury Schweppes, cit.
74 J.M. iglesias Casais and n. loBato Mosquera, “La vigencia del principio de territorialidad fiscal como mecanismo 
corrector de la extensión de las libertades comunitarias a los sistemas fiscales de los Estados miembros”, in Documentos nº 
9/2013, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid, 2013.
75 r. sanz góMez, “Las cláusulas anti‑abuso específicas tributarias frente a las libertades de circulación de la Unión Euro-
pea”, cit., p. 21.
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of rights designed under the UE acquis which on one hand constitutes as the teleological interpretation 
of the UE´s own freedoms and the secondary UE law, and on the other hand, as the existence of causes 
of justification of the existence of a restrictive or discriminatory treatment with regards to the practice 
of such rights and freedoms. 
92. Because of this, it´s necessary that the Court carries out a thorough analysis of the causes of 
justification that allow such measures that at the start may be qualified as discriminatory or restrictive, 
may be declared compatible with the UE legal system. 
93. As we have already mentioned, the Court has had the opportunity to express that the need to 
avoid tax evasion cannot justify a discriminatory or restrictive treatment of the fundamental freedoms 
but that they can only admit such measures if, on the basis of rule of reason76, they are justified for a 
matter of overriding general interest being obliged that their application is suitable to guarantee the com-
pletion of the intended purpose and not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it77. 
94. Thus, their way of thinking will begin by analysing if it produces a restriction of a funda-
mental freedom or if there has been a discriminatory effect and in this respect, the distinction of the 
assumptions of discrimination and restriction has been the subject of an interesting doctrinal reflection: 
whilst discrimination implicates the essential comparison of two diverse situations that, such as, IGLE-
SIAS CASAIS confirms, takes as its starting point the distinction between residents and non‑residents, 
so that the diversity of tax treatment between the two is fully justified on the basis that both are in 
no comparable situations78, the restriction does not require such comparison, but a simple analysis of 
whether the measures in question suppose an obstacle for the achievement of a UE freedom. This dis-
tinction would implicate that the way of reasoning should be different treating one or another question, 
as evidenced by Advocate General GEELHOED in his findings in the Test Claimants in the Thin Cap 
Group Litigation79 case, although what is certain is that, despite the doctrinal distinction, this has not had 
too many implications in the jurisprudence of the Court.  
95. Therefore, to carry out a thorough analysis on the substantial differences between the con-
cepts restriction and discrimination is not relevant to this study, particularly when the Court usually 
alludes to expressly describe a measure as discriminatory80 and this can be understood as a waiver to 
apply this distinction in tax matters.  
96. However, what is of interest to our study is, as we announced at the beginning of this section, 
the fact that the Court recognises the possibility to restrict the fundamental freedoms in cases of abuse, 
and from this perspective, the freedom that has had its greatest impact on the legal systems in the Mem-
ber States is, without a doubt, the freedom of establishment, because it is built on the most relevant case 
law, that is being studied in the present work. In the words of the Court the concept of establishment, 
in the sense of the Treaty, is very broad and implies the possibility that a UE citizen has a stable and 
continuous participation in the economic life of a different Member State than the hosting State, and 
that it benefits from favouring economic and social interpenetration within the UE in the field of self‑
employment activities81. 
76 e. roth, “The Rule of Reason Doctrine in European Court of Justice Jurisprudence on Direct taxation”, in Canadian Tax 
Journal / Revue Fiscale Canadienne, vol. 56, nº 1, 2008, pp. 73 y 74. 
77 Judgment of 30 november 1995, Gebhard (Case C‑55/94) ECLI:EU:C:1995:411, para. 37; Judgment of 15 may 1997, 
Futura Participations and Singer (Case C‑250/95) ECLI:EU:C:1997:239, para. 26; Judgment of 11 march 2004, de Lasteyrie 
du Saillant (Case C-9/02) ECLI:EU:C:2004:138, para. 49.
78 J.M. iglesias Casais, “No discriminación fiscal y derecho de establecimiento en la Unión Europea”, cit., p. 65.
79 Judgment of 13 march 2007, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation (Case C-524/04) ECLI:EU:C:2007:161 
and Opinion delivered on 29 june 2006.
80 V. ruiz alMenDral, “Tax avoidance and the European Court of Justice: ¿What is at stake for European general An-
ti‑Avoidance Rules?”, in Intertax, vol. 33, nº 12, 2005, p. 569.
81 Gebhard, cit., para. 25.
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97. This agreement on the basic content of the freedom of establishment was already raised by 
the Advocate General DARMON, in his findings82 in the Daily Mail case, where established that the 
concept of establishment itself is essentially an economic one and it always implies a genuine econo-
mic link. The transfer of the central management and control of a company, understood by reference 
to criteria which are more economic than legal is covered by the right of establishment in so far as it is 
necessary to determine in concrete terms the economic centre of gravity of the undertaking. Thus, the 
concept of central management and control corresponds not merely to the physical location of the prin-
cipal administrative services but also, and perhaps principally, to the place from which the company is 
actually run. The real head office is normally the place where the company’ s central management and 
administration is located, since that is the place in which the decisions concerning the company’ s inde-
pendent activity are made and from which that activity is set in motion; in other words, it is the centre 
from which that activity is exercised. For the first time, it is stated that establish oneself is to integrate 
in a national economy through two basics aspects that are the physical settlement and the practice of an 
economic activity, both with character, which if not permanent will at least be long lasting. 
98. According to IGLESIAS CASAIS, the substance of the freedom of establishment can be 
summarised firstly in a mandate of non‑discrimination or national treatment of the citizens from Mem-
ber States, that guarantees them the application of the same conditions that apply to nationals, in the 
access to the practice of a non‑paid activities when they want to establish themselves in another Member 
State and secondly in the prohibition of existence of whatever restriction or obstacle to its practice based 
on the nationality or residence that derives from the application of the internal provisions of the Member 
States, the enforcement of rules of non‑public nature which is intended to regulate self‑employment 
collectively and the provision of services and, finally, those resulting from administrative practices83.  
99. Thus, once the substantive content of freedom of establishment is defined, we then need to 
consider what is the reasoning of the Court to determine when we are facing an abusive practice of said 
freedom or, in other words, when can a national anti‑abuse rule that is restrictive or discriminatory be 
considered justified in accordance with UE law, for the practice of that freedom of establishment. To 
do this, as we move to the beginning of this paragraph, the mode of reasoning by the Court will begin 
by analysing if it produces a restriction of a fundamental freedom or if there has been a discriminatory 
effect in understanding that there is no doubt on the cross-border nature of the matter. 
100. The line of reasoning followed that is explained clearly in the following quote from Cen-
tros: the national measures that may hinder or make the practice of fundamental freedoms guaranteed 
by the Treaty less appealing, must bring together four requirements: they must be applied in a non‑
discriminatory manner, that are justified by a matter of overriding general interest that is suitable to 
ensure attainment of the objective that they pursue and not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that 
objective84. That is to say, the proportionality involves the adaptation of means to its aims, the suitability 
of the instruments used, and its character needed and limited to achieve the objective in question. 
101. In this line, the Court shall verify compliance with this requirement, a test of compatibility 
of the anti‑abuse rule with the UE system named rule of reason or simply and plainly, test of abuse that 
in its first expression, will analyse if the objective pursued by the quoted anti‑elusion rule is legitimate 
and congruent with the ultimate goal (that must be, without any doubt, a motive of general interest). 
102. In the Cadbury85 case in which it is subject to question the compatibility with UE law of 
specific legislation on so‑called controlled foreign companies, the UK Government shall support that 
82 Opinion delivered on 7 june 1988, Daily Mail, Case 81/87.
83 J.M. iglesias Casais, “No discriminación fiscal y derecho de establecimiento en la Unión Europea”, cit., p. 133.
84 Centros, cit., para. 34.
85 Cadbury Schweppes, cit., para. 51, leaning on ICI, cit., para. 26; Judgment of 12 december 2002, Lakhorst-Hohorst (Case 
C‑324/00) ECLI:EU:C:2002:749, para. 37; de Lasteyrei du Saillant, cit., para. 50, and Marks & Spencer, cit., para. 57.
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this rule has the objective to fight against a special form of consistent tax evasion in which a resident 
company artificially transfers profits from a Member State in which they have been obtained, to a State 
with a reduced level of taxation through the creation of a subsidiary and the attainment of operations 
destined mainly to effect that transference of profits of the subsidiary. 
103. The Court, giving answer to the UK´s approach, shall admit that effectively, a national 
measure that restricts the freedoms of establishment can be justified where it specifically targets wholly 
artificial arrangements aimed at circumventing the application of the law of the Member State concerned. 
104. As we can see, the demand for a specific object that is legitimate, and is congruent with 
overriding public interest entails a first proper exam in which the Court strictly applies; it has systemati-
cally rejected the argument of the existence of a risk of fraud or evasion, or including the aim of assuring 
or protecting the tax revenue, to accept restrictive or discriminatory anti‑elusive measures, as we can 
observe In ICI when it establishes that it must note that the decrease of taxes resulting not among the re-
asons mentioned in the article 56 of the Treaty and cannot be considered as an overriding public interest 
that can be invoked to justify unequal treatment in principle incompatible with Article 52 of the Treaty86. 
105. They will, among others, be the principle of fiscal territoriality, to base it on what different 
countries build their tax system on, the need to ensure fiscal coherence87 in other words, there unity 
between the measures and the intended aims in the regulations of each tribute, the need to preserve the 
balance allocation of taxing rights88 the need to guarantee the efficiency of the tax controls89 and the 
fight against abusive practices derived from the practice of UE freedoms (or the rights of the European 
Union) the causes of justification of the adoption of measures that can be characterised as restrictive or 
discriminatory that the Court has supported repeatedly90. 
106. As we have had the opportunity to define the simple practice of UE freedoms, in the search 
for a more beneficial legal regime it cannot be invoked to justify a general presumption of abusive 
practise and serve as justification to measures that go against the practice of a fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Treaty, however these must pursue, without any room for doubts, the defence of an 
overriding public interest that is considered compatible with the UE system. 
107. The second analysis consists of studying if the anti‑abuse measure adopted is suitable to 
attain the legitimate objective pursued. Continuing with the Cadbury case, the Court refers to it in para-
graph 59 in the sentencing to affirm that by providing for the inclusion of the profits of a CFC subject to 
[a] very favourable tax regime in the tax base of the resident company, the legislation on CFCs makes 
it possible to thwart practices which have no purpose other than to escape the tax normally due on the 
profits generated by the activities carried on the national territory. (…)  Such legislation can achieve, 
therefore, the purpose for which it was adopted.  
108. The States have the tendency to configure anti‑abuse rules with the widest possible scope 
in a legitimate protectionist framework in their fiscal interest, but what becomes evident is that the Court 
86 ICI, cit., para. 28.
87 Judgment of 28 january 1992, Bachmann (Case C-204/90) ECLI:EU:C:1992:35, Commission/Bélgium, cit., and Judg-
ment of 23 october 2008, Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt (Case C-157/07) ECLI:EU:C:2008:588.  
88 Judgment of 29 march 2007, Rewe Zentralfinanz (also known as Cassis de Dijon) (Case C-347/04) ECLI:EU:C:2007:194, 
Judgment of 18 july 2007, Oy AA (Case C‑231/05) ECLI:EU:C:2007:439, Judgment of 8 november 2007, Amurta (Case 
C‑379/05) ECLI:EU:C:2007:655 and Judgment of 18 june 2009, Aberdeen (Case C-303/07) ECLI:EU:C:2009:377.
89 Futura Participations and Singer, cit., para. 31, and Judgment of 8 de july 1999, Baxter and others, Case (C-254/97) 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:368, para. 18.
90 Judgment of 28 january 1992, Bachmann (Case C‑204/90) ECLI:EU:C:1992:3, Judgment of 19 april 2000, Baars (Case 
C‑251/98) ECLI:EU:C:2000:205, Judgment of 18 September 2003, Bosal (Case C‑168/01) ECLI:EU:C:2003:479, Emsland-
Stärke, cit., and Opinion delivered on 7 april 2005, Halifax case.
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does not accept, under any circumstances, that these rules have an expansive character. The irrebuttable 
presumptions in law abuse are rejected by generalists or deemed inadequate to achieve the intended 
purpose that is simply to prevent the misuse of freedoms and UE rights without such a goal, it could 
dislodge a restriction, which would threaten its practice. In short, it’s about analysing if being able to 
declare a national rule as restrictive or discriminatory, however there may be reasons to justify such a 
statement as compatible with the law. 
109. Finally, the submission of the national anti‑abuse legislation on the principal of proportio-
nality assumes that the final step of analysis that the Court takes in the measure in question is to determi-
ne whether it is compatible with UE law. This principal presupposes the existence of two interests that 
are relevant to the legal system and that are found in conflict, being the objective of this principal to fulfil 
one of the interests in the way that least affects the other, always in the subject of a concrete case91; in 
such a case, not only must the application of the anti‑abuse measure be suitable to guarantee the attain-
ment of the intended purpose, but also, must not go what is beyond necessary to achieve it. Elements 
such as the burden of proof, establishing reasonable presumptive criteria, the permeability of the rule 
admitting exceptions to its application or fulfilment of its judgement of necessity involve a balance of 
proportionality between the stakes, based on this, we will take a closer look in the following sections of 
this paper. In conclusion, whichever measure adopted by the Member State that constitutes a restriction 
to the freedom of establishment, or produces a discriminatory effect is initially prohibited by the Treaty 
in the measure in which makes the practice of that freedom less attractive. 
110. However, as deduced from the case law from the Court of Justice that it may admit a res-
triction to the freedom of establishment if it is justified by matters of overriding general interest being 
accurate and, moreover suitable to guarantee the attainment of the intended purpose and that does not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve it. 
111. In this sense, a national measure restricting freedom of establishment may be justified whe-
re it specifically targets wholly artificial arrangements aimed at circumventing the application of the law 
of the Member State concerned, and in order that a restriction on freedom of establishment can be jus-
tified on the grounds of prevention of abusive practices, the specific objective of such a restriction must 
be directed to oppose consistent behaviours on creating wholly artificial events, which do not reflect 
economic reality and with the sole objective to avoid the taxes that are normally due from the profits 
generated from activities carried out in national territory. 
112. As we have already mentioned, the Commission92 has already advised that the European 
Union must centre itself particularly in the adoption of measures that help the Member States to fight 
against fraud and tax evasion. The needs to prevent abusive practices or tax evasion can constitute as 
a matter of overriding general interest capable of justifying a restriction on fundamental freedoms. 
Without losing sight at any moment that the starting point of the Court, in the cases in which they analy-
se abuse of rights, is the proportionality between the adopted anti‑abuse measure and the possible harm 
to be avoided, the legitimacy of the restrictive rules is conditioned precisely to the compliance with the 
principle of proportionality, moreover that these rules apply especially with the aim to avoid wholly 
artificial arrangements93. 
91 r. sanz góMez, “Las cláusulas anti‑abuso específicas tributarias frente a las libertades de circulación de la Unión Euro-
pea”, cit., p. 127.
92 COM (2001) 260 final.
93 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, 
the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee — The application of anti‑abuse measures in the 
area of direct taxation — within the EU and in relation to third countries, COM (2007) 785 final, 2009/C 77/29, Brussels, 2009.
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A) Factual situations that invoke the fight against abusive practices in taxation as justification 
113. We have insisted throughout this work in the idea that the employment of UE freedoms 
to achieve the application of a certain legal regime is not in itself abusive, and that to achieve it, the 
Member States´ anti‑circumvention rules must be assessed with the necessary prudence. Moreover, in 
this respect a case analysis must be carried out in which it does not rule out that circumvention may 
ultimately be legitimate from the perspective of the UE legal system. 
114. Therefore, analysing the tension that occurs between the interest of the Member States and 
the UE legal order, through the factual circumstances in which mainly fight against abusive practices, 
and involves a practical exercise, which is not limited in its analysis, and may help to clarify the posi-
tion taken by the Court. If they examine the sentences in which the matter of freedom of establishment 
is invoked in the application of a national restrictive or discriminatory anti‑circumvention rule of such 
freedom, we find that it results in some very concrete factual assumptions. 
115. Firstly, through the creation of companies in different Member States with lower taxation 
(or creation of foreign subsidiaries by SEC), the international fiscal transparency system aims to pro-
duce an erosion of tax bases, either by the transfer of the profits of the parent to that other company 
incorporated in the hosting state or by practices that constitute in organising transfer of losses within 
a group of companies, to established companies in the Member States that apply the highest rates of 
taxation, and consequently, where the tax value of these losses is greater, which can result in impairing 
the rights of the Member States to practice their fiscal competition in relation with the activities carried 
out in their territory and therefore jeopardise the balance in the allocation of taxing rights between 
Member States. 
116. A clear example of this is analysed in Cadbury, where the Court will have the opportunity 
to examine the compatibility with the UE Law of a national regime relative to SEC and its aim is to fight 
against tax evasion and the consistent practice in which a company with residence in a Member State 
transfers its taxable profits to a company which it controls that’s deployed in another State, that applies 
a tax rate well below the current one applied in the State of origin. 
117. The question is based on determining if by constituting a company in another Member 
State with the sole basis of the existence of a more favourable tax regime in that State, is practising 
the fundamental freedoms or on the contrary, if it constitutes an abuse of said freedoms: the national 
legislation on SEC on this matter is contracted to the fact that a foreign subsidiary, in which the parent 
company has a superior participation of 50%, is treated like a transparent entity and therefore it attribu-
tes to the profits of the branch to the parent company and included in the tax base of the latter, although 
the latter was not noticed. 
118. This legislation applies when the subsidiary established in another State is subject to a 
lower level of tax in this other State, so the intent of the legislation is to ultimately determine if the fact 
that a parent company created this subsidiary in another Member State in order to qualify for a more 
favourable tax regime, constitutes in itself as an abusive practice of the freedom of establishment.  
119. The Court has reiterated, firstly, that a Member State cannot prevent a company from exer-
cising its right of establishment in another Member State on the basis that the transaction would result in 
a tax loss with respect to taxes that would have been payable due to future activity if the company had 
practiced that activity in their home state. Similarly, the mere fact that a resident company establishes 
a secondary establishment in another Member State cannot form a general presumption of fraud or tax 
evasion and justify a measure which compromises the exercise of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by 
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the Treaty94 and the establishment of a company in another Member State does not imply tax evasion, 
while the company concerned is however, subject to the law of that State95. 
120. Finally, it can also be deduced from the case law that a Member State cannot hinder the 
exercise of freedom of movement in another Member State under the pretext of the reduced level of 
taxation96. The Court is not going to argue the rights of a company to rely on the protection conferred by 
the Treaty, as far as the exercise of freedom of establishment is concerned, even when it´s only practiced 
with the aim of remaining a subject of a more favourable tax regime.  Where it will set the threshold for 
justification of national anti‑abuse measure is actually in the analysis of whether the subsidiary has a 
real and effective activity in the hosting State. The tax level constitutes an element that can legitimately 
bear in mind a company at the time of choosing a hosting State, in which it plans to create a subsidiary, 
being able to decide to practice its secondary activities in another Member State to benefit from the more 
favourable fiscal regime in this other State with regards to the taxation of taxable activities. 
121. However, a national measure that restricts the freedom of establishment can be justified 
when it specifically targets wholly artificial arrangements whose aim is to circumvent the legislation 
applied by a Member State that specifically targets this concept of wholly artificial arrangement like the 
practices mentioned in Marks & Spencer97, that consists of organising transfer of losses within a group 
of companies to companies established in the Member States that apply high rates of tax and conse-
quently where the tax value of these losses is higher, in which the Court will without a doubt impair the 
rights of the Member State to practice its tax competition in relation with the activities carried out in its 
territory and jeopardise the balance in the allocation of taxing powers. 
122. Similarly, the ECJ in Test Claimants in the CFC and Dividend Group Litigation when it 
confirms that in those circumstances, in order for the legislation on CFCs to comply with UE law, the 
taxation provided for by that legislation must be excluded where the incorporation of a CFC reflects 
economic reality, despite the existence of tax motives. That finding must be based on objective factors 
which are ascertainable by third parties with particular respect to the extent to which the CFC physically 
exists in terms of premises, staff and equipment98.  
123. Therefore, and although later we will take a closer look on the notion of wholly artificial 
arrangements to widen your understanding, we can conclude that the Court in the matters in which it had 
the opportunity to analyse the cases of international tax transparency, maintains the reasoning for which 
it understands that the UE legal system opposes the inclusion of a tax base of a company with residence 
in a Member State with profits obtained by a foreign company controlled by another Member State, 
when these profits are subjects in the latter State with a lower taxation level to that applied in the first 
State, unless such an inclusion only concerns those purely artificial arrangements destined to circumvent 
the national tax that’s normally due. 
124. This limitation does not compromise the application of the rules on the prices of transfers, 
granted that it must be in keeping within this section for its necessary natural identity because it must 
serve to address non‑trade agreement prices between related companies. Therefore, the SEC rules must 
have the utility to complement the relative rules for determining the residence of a company, or the 
prices of transfer, in the measures that constitute an instrument to combat the types of artificial fiscal 
operations. 
94 Commission/Belgium, cit. para. 45.
95 Judgment of 8 march 2001, Metallgesellschaft and others (Joined Cases C‑397/98 and C‑410/98), ECLI:EU:C:2001:134, 
para. 57, and Lankhorst-Hohorst, cit., para. 37.
96 Opinion of Mr Advocate leger delivered on 2 may 2006, Cadbury.
97 Marks & Spencer, cit., para. 49.
98 Order of the Court (Fourth Chamber) 23 April 2008, Test Claimants in the CFC and Dividend Group Litigation, Case 
C-201/05, apartado 79.
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125. A second assumption that constitutes the undercapitalisation that is defined as an evident 
disproportion between the magnitudes of the responsibility of fixed, legal or statutory capital, and the 
level of financial risk of a company. The design of undercapitalization rules has been approached from 
many different perspectives, reflecting the different mentalities and legal traditions in the Member Sta-
tes, even though the background is very similar, if not identical: between the alternatives of finance that 
the companies have within their reach, they can turn to equity through loans or through capitalisation, 
bearing in mind that these alternatives, from a tax perspective, are not perfect alternatives, although whi-
le external funding generated in taxation has the possibility of deductibility of interest paid, a company 
decides to obtain resources through their own (internal) funding not only will they lose this deductibility 
but could also generate problems of double taxation (taxation of dividends or share in profits). 
126. In that regard, and to avoid the internal funding generating losses of tax deductibility, the 
entities of multinational groups can have as an option the granting of loans within the entities of the 
group that are generating a certain margin of action to select the taxing of the diverse entities, in a way 
that those whose residence for tax purposes is located in a country with a higher rate of tax is in debt 
with entities with residence in areas of lower taxation.  
127. The different treatment between debt and equity financing under national tax law (and at 
bilateral level), resulting in the taxing rights on the hosting State being generally more limited than those 
on dividends, making debt financing considerably more attractive in cross‑border context and can the-
refore lead to the erosion of the tax base in the state of the subsidiary. By abolishing their thin cap rules 
altogether or by carving out dealings with lenders resident in other MSs and EEA States, the difference 
in treatment between resident subsidiaries according to the seat of their parent company within the EU/
EEA would be removed. 
128. The Commission is of the opinion that Member States should, however, be able to protect 
their tax bases from artificial erosion through structured debt financing, also within the EU/EEA. Fo-
llowing Lankhorst, some Member States have tried to avoid the charge of discrimination by extending 
the application of their thin cap rules to cover also purely national relations99.  
129. In that case, the German company Lankhorst‑Hohorst GmbH (henceforth Lankhorst‑Ho-
horst) whose sole shareholder was the company Lankhorst‑Hohorst BV (henceforth LHBV), based in 
the Netherlands has as its sole shareholder of the company, the Dutch company Lankhorst Taselaar BV 
(henceforth LTBV). LTBV granted a loan to Lankhorst‑Hohorst to be returned in ten years with a varia-
ble interest rate and that would serve as an alternative to the increase in capital, being accompanied by 
a statement of sponsorship of which LTBV would renounce the loan repayment if third‑party creditors 
sued Lankhorst‑Hohorst. The loan allowed Lankhorst‑Hohorst to reduce another loan that they had con-
certed with the banking establishment AMRO‑Bank Münster, and therefore reduce the interest charges 
that withstood. In their liquidations of tax assessments on companies corresponding to the 1997 and 
1998 practices, the tax authorities considered the interest payments to LTBV as equivalent to a distribu-
tion of profits and subjected them to such taxes. 
130. The German, Danish and UK Governments, as well as the Commission, argue that the na-
tional provision at issue in the main proceedings is intended to combat tax evasion to which would lead 
to the use of the mechanisms such as thin capitalization or undercapitalisation and, all other things being 
equal, it would be fiscally advantageous to finance a subsidiary through a loan rather than through capi-
tal contributions, as profits of the subsidiary to the parent company are transferred to the parent company 
in the form of deductible interest upon the calculating taxable profits of the subsidiary, not in the form of 
non‑deductible dividends. The Court, however, will not allow such allegation and will keep influencing 
99 COM (2007) 785 final, cit., p. 8.
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in the decrease of tax revenue, not constituting as an overriding reason relating to public interest that can 
justify a contrary measure for a fundamental freedom100. 
131. Where the justification relating to risk of tax evasion is concerned, it should be noted that 
the disputed rules in the main litigation do not have a specific aim to exclude from a tax advantage the 
wholly artificial arrangements but that in general, contemplate whichever situation in which the parents 
company has, no matter what the motive, their domicile outside the Federal Republic of Germany, and 
so this situation does not imply a risk of tax evasion, as the company in question will be subject in every 
way to the tax legislation of the State of establishment. Moreover, the national Court does not consider 
the existence of any abuse in this case, as the loan is attained to reduce the burden of the amount of in-
terest resulting from their bank credit and released the documents before the Court which showed, that 
during 1996 and 1998 financial years, Lankhorst‑Hohorst suffered substantial losses much higher than 
the interest paid to LTBV. 
132. Therefore, despite the facts analysed, Lankhorst‑Hohorst meets all benchmarks for the use 
of the mechanism thin capitalization. For it to be considered abusive by the Court it must exceed the 
triple test to which the legislation is submitted, but this is not enough to determine the existence of the 
mechanism for it to be considered unlawful.  
133. In this regard, in the judgement Test Claimants in Thin Cap Group Litigation the ECJ 
confirmed that certain measures used to avoid undercapitalisation were not unacceptable by still being 
needed to limit their application in wholly artificial arrangements. This could guarantee that the condi-
tions of the operations of debt financing arrangements between affiliates do not exceed the limits of what 
unrelated parties would have agreed on based on valid commercial reasons. 
134. The Member States cannot make their fiscal systems work efficiently unless they can gua-
rantee that their tax bases do not suffer erosion due to the agreements in non‑commercial terms between 
related companies. So, in that case a national legislation is analysed which restricts the ability of a re-
sident company to deduct interest on loan finance for tax purposes, which has been granted by a parent 
company with residence in another Member State, the reason for this, is to fight against abusive practi-
ces and especially against wholly artificial arrangements solely used for tax purposes.  
135. A law on thin capitalization rules is judged containing provisions that occasionally restrict 
the deductibility of interest paid by subsidiaries to non‑resident companies. Logically, this measure does 
not apply if the payment was between residents. The part of the interests that exceeds a reasonable eco-
nomic performance is not deductible from the taxable profits of the borrowing company but is treated 
as distributed profit (dividend); likewise, at a later point they will reassess the interests paid between 
companies of the same group as distributed profit, as far as they exceeded what would have been paid in 
the absence of a link between paying the interest and the beneficiary. 
136. In this matter the Court starts to accept that, within a group of companies, the risk that 
the finance of a subsidiary provides a way that produces a transfer of profits towards the State with a 
lower tax rate, does not normally exist if all the companies are subject to the same rate of tax in the 
same Member State. However, this does not exclude the fact that the rules adopted by a Member State 
to specifically consider the cross‑border group situation, can in some cases constitute as a restriction of 
freedom of establishment for the companies involved. 
137. In that case, to consider that such a legislation constitutes a restriction on the freedom of 
establishment, to such a degree that it can restrict the practice of this freedom in a Member State through 
100 ICI, cit., para. 28, Metallgesellschaft and others, cit., para. 59, and Judgment of 21 september 1999, Saint-Gobain ZN 
(Case C-307/97) ECLI:EU:C:1999:438, para. 51.
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established companies in another Member State, without having to prove that the legislation involved 
led to some of those companies to refrain from acquiring, creating or maintaining a subsidiary in the first 
Member State. From this, it results that the difference in treatment to which they are subjected to under 
the controversial national provisions in the main proceedings relating to thin capitalization, and resident 
borrowing companies based on the place of residence of the affiliated company lender, constitutes a 
restriction of freedoms of establishment. 
138. The fact that a resident company has obtained a loan from a non‑resident company under 
conditions that do not correspond with what the companies involved would have agreed to in free com-
petition conditions constitutes for the Member State of residence of the borrowing company an objective 
element and verifiable by third parties to determine if the transaction involved constitutes, totally or par-
tially, a wholly artificial arrangement whose main objective is to avoid the court legislation in this Mem-
ber State. In this respect, it is whether in the absence of a special relationship between the companies 
in question, they would not have agreed to the loan or would have agreed on a different rate of interest. 
139. In further points out that, at first, it is completely valid, and, in reality, crucial that the taxpa-
yer tries to organise their cross‑border fiscal situations advantageously for the idea of an internal market. 
However, this by itself is allowed in the measure in which such an organisation conforms to reality: in 
other words, there is no question of a purely artificial arrangement designed to abuse the national tax 
legislation or evade. 
140. In this sense the European Court will settle admitting that, if the mere circumstance that 
a resident company obtains a loan from an associated company established in another Member State it 
cannot invoke to justify a general presumption of abusive practices, nor serve as a justification to a mea-
sure that goes against the practice of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty101, a rule such as 
that may be compatible with the legal system if: on one hand, this legislation is based on a consideration 
of objective and verifiable elements that identifies the existence of a wholly artificial arrangement so-
lely for tax purposes. To do this, you must establish the possibility that the taxpayer may submit, where 
applicable, and without being subject to undue administrative constraints, evidence for the underlying 
commercial reasons for the transaction; and on the other hand, if the existence of such assembly is de-
monstrated, such legislation only labels these interests as distributed profits to the extent to which they 
exceed what would have been agreed under the conditions of free competition. 
141. Therefore, the detection of a wholly artificial arrangement thus amounts in effect to a subs-
tance‑overform analysis and even though there are few sentences that directly address configuration of 
thin capitalisation rules102, the conclusion that may be drawn from this is that it is possible that the exis-
tence of these rules is perfectly compatible with the UE system as long as the rule allows the substance‑
overform analysis and the mere fact that the constitution of a loan (or another credit operation) between 
related parties does not involve a presumption of objective fraud. However, the coherence of the fiscal 
system could justify the anti‑capitalization rule since it is incardinated to the correct formation of the 
taxable income tax and equity in the distribution of tax revenues between the state in which investment 
and residence occur.  
142. The Court of Justice demands the existence of a direct link, for one particular taxpayer, 
between the grant of a tax advantage and the offsetting of that advantage by a fiscal levy103. In this regard 
is can be confirmed that the direct link doctrine would expel the anti‑capitalisation rule from the scope 
of the justification based on fiscal coherence. Perhaps the Court of Justice has tried to limit the potentia-
101 Commission/Belgium, cit., para. 45; Commission/France, cit., para. 27, and Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes 
Overseas, cit., para. 50.
102 Judgment of 17 january 2008, Lammers & Van Cleeff (Case C-105/07) ECLI:EU:C:2008:24.
103 Judgment of 6 june 2000, Verkooijen (Case C-35/98) ECLI:EU:C:2000:294.
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lly high ripple effect of the fiscal coherence doctrine through the direct link doctrine, but in doing so is 
probably also closing doors to balanced judgments104. 
143. In any case, in those cases in which the indebtedness is disproportionate, or has a sole 
objective of eroding the tax bases; is justified and is suitable to ensure the attainment of the objective in 
question, it´s possible to understand that a thin capitalisation rule pursues a legitimate objective. 
B) The jurisprudential doctrine of justification 
144. It has been sufficiently expressed in the work that employment of the UE freedoms to achieve 
the implementation of a certain favourable legal regime cannot invoke to justify a general presumption of 
abusive practices or to serve as justification to measures that go against their effective practice105. 
145. Being genuine UE freedom rights subjected to the economic agents that operate in the 
common market and are invoked before the States where they want to carry out an economic activity or 
investment, or before their States of residence106, it is settled case‑law that the fact of the existence of 
an advantage resulting in a lower tax burden that is being submitted in a Member State of origin, does 
not solely justify that the State of origin claims to compensate this advantage with a less favourable tax 
treatment to the resident company within it107. 
146. Similarly, the need to avoid the risk of tax evasion does not solely justify a discriminatory 
or restrictive treatment of the fundamental freedoms108 and especially the freedom of establishment, the 
Court of Justice has since declared that the circumstance in which the company has constituted itself in 
a Member State with the aim of benefitting from a more favourable legislation, is not solely sufficient to 
reach a conclusion that an abuse of this freedom exists109. 
147. Thus, from the study on the doctrine of the Court of Justice it can be confirmed that only 
those anti‑abuse rules which are designed to render ineffective the artificial transactions that do not con-
tain real economic substance, and whose existence is aimed at obtaining a tax advantage with no other 
valid reason, can justify a discriminatory or restrictive treatment of fundamental freedoms. 
a) The jurisprudential analysis of national anti-abuse tax law 
148. As we have already mentioned, the proportionality implies that the suitability of the means 
used for the proposed purposes, the suitability of the employed instruments and their character, are 
necessary and limited in reaching the objective in question. In this way, the Court, applying the rule 
of reason will firstly analyse if the objective pursued by that anti‑circumvention rule is legitimate and 
justified by overriding reasons of general interest110. 
149. From among the causes that are accepted by the Court as justified from the adoption of 
restrictive or discriminatory measures by the Member States, and that we have already had the chance 
104 e. sanz gaDea, “Medidas antielusión fiscal”, in Documentos de Trabajo del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, nº 18/09, 
2009, p. 63.
105 Commission/Bélgium, cit., X e Y, cit., Commission/France, cit., and Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Over-
seas, cit.
106 a. Martín JiMénez, “Globalización y derecho tributario: el impacto del derecho Comunitario sobre las cláusulas anti‑
elusión/anti‑abuso del derecho interno”, cit., p. 6.
107 Judgment of 3 october 2002, Danner (Case C-136/00) ECLI:EU:C:2002:558, para. 56.
108 Judgment of 11 december 2003, Barbier (Case C-364/01) ECLI:EU:C:2003:665, para. 71.
109 Centros, cit., para 27, and Inspire Art, cit., para. 96.
110 Rewe-Zentral AG, cit., para. 14.
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to examine the fight against abusive practices the main interest is to observe their treatment by the juris-
prudence of the Court and in relation with the freedom of establishment: a national measure that restricts 
the freedom of establishment may be justified where it specifically targets wholly artificial arrangements 
aimed at circumventing the application of the law of the Member State concerned. In assessing the beha-
viour of the person subject to taxation, they must take into particular consideration, the purpose for the 
freedom of establishment111 and this aim is to allow a national in a Member State to create a secondary 
establishment in another Member State in which it can practice its activities and thus favour the econo-
mic and social interpenetration within the UE112.  
150. From this it deduces that in order for a restriction on the freedom of establishment to be 
justified for motives of fighting against abusive practices, the specific aim of this restriction must object 
to consistent behaviours in creating purely artificial arrangements, which do not reflect economic reali-
ty, with the aim to avoid the taxes normally owed on the benefits generated by activities carried out in 
national territory, such as it shows in both the ICI sentence and in Metallgesellschaft and others. 
151. The Court of Justice has recognised on a number of occasions that the Member States may 
justifiably adopt measures that would be branded as discriminatory under different circumstances, in 
order to prevent abuse of law, as made clear in the Marks & Spencer sentence, in which the Court of 
Justice declared that firstly, a restrictive national rule on the deduction of cross‑border losses could be 
justified by the risk of tax evasion, and in particular the risk that, within a group of companies, the losses 
were transferred to the established companies in the Member States that applied higher tax rates and 
where the tax value of losses was higher113.  
152. The main reason behind the recognition of this justification is that the taxpayers try to orga-
nise their (cross‑border) fiscal positions more advantageously, but to the extent that such an organization 
conforms to reality: in other words, there is no question of a purely artificial arrangement directed to 
abuse or to avoid the national fiscal legislation. However, this justification does not comply if the rule 
applies to all types of situations and moreover, most of the anti‑abuse provisions that exist to prevent the 
elusion through wholly artificial arrangements in defence of their legitimacy have been rejected by the 
Court such as, the allegations that expected to defend objectives of merely economic character, such as 
the loss of tax revenue, constantly invoked by the Member States and that do not constitute for the Court 
an overriding public interest114 under any concept.  
153. In fact, the Commission states that there is a urgent need to find a fair balance between 
public interest in combatting abusive practices and the need to avoid an exaggerated restriction of the 
cross‑border activity within the EU115 and, according to settled case‑law, only a justification based on the 
fight against tax fraud is permissible when its intended purpose is to have wholly artificial arrangements 
designed to circumvent the tax law, which excludes all general presumption of fraud. 
154. Therefore, a general presumption of evasion or of tax avoidance cannot be enough to jus-
tify a fiscal means that goes against the objectives of the Treaty116. 
111 Centros, cit., para. 25, and X e Y, cit., para. 42.
112 Reyners, cit., para. 21
113 Marks & Spencer, cit., paras. 49 y 50, Lankhorst Hohorst, cit., X e Y, cit., ICI, cit., Leur Bloem, cit., and Judgment of 
Halifax, cit.
114 Verkooijen, cit., para. 48.
115 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, 
the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee — The application of anti‑abuse measures in the 
area of direct taxation — within the EU and in relation to third countries COM (2007) 785 final (2009/C 77/29), para 2.3.
116 Commission/Belgium, cit., para. 45; Commission/France, cit., para. 27, and Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes 
Overseas, cit., para. 50.
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155. The next question that the Court must address in the development of the rule of reason is 
if the legislation in question, or the anti‑abuse measure analysed is adequate to achieve the target objec-
tive. In Cadbury, the Court pleaded that by providing for the inclusion of the profits of a CFC subjects 
to very favourable tax regime in the tax base of the resident company, the legislation on CFC´s makes 
it possible to thwart practices which have no purpose other than to escape the tax normally due on the 
profits generated by activities carried on in national territory.  
156. As it has stated, such legislation is therefore suitable to achieve the objective for which it 
was adopted117.  In the Test Claimants matter it questions if the legislation in question is appropriate to 
achieve this objective, concluding that it is both legitimate interests that are pursued in imposing that 
the cross‑border groups qualify, abusively and artificially, as interest payment for loans which in reality 
are distributions, the requalification of the interest payments as distributions is obviously effective in 
counteracting such abuse118. 
157. However, in X and Y, the Court once examined the controversial rule, understanding that 
this disposition does not have a specific aim to deny the application of a tax advantage for purely artifi-
cial arrangements whose aim is to avoid the tributary regulations but that generally refers to, whichever 
situation in which, for whatever motive, the transfer at undervalue is in favour of a company incorpo-
rated under the laws of another Member State in which the transferor or a subsidiary of that company 
participates. To do this, it should be noted that the measure applied does not get to reach the objective 
that it supposedly follows, specifically, effective taxation in the host Member State of the transferor for 
capital gains on shares transferred, particularly if the transfer is made before the transferor definitely 
transferred their residence abroad.  
158. Ultimately, as we can observe, it is absolutely essential for the Court that, together with the 
aim the anti‑circumvention rule targets, the rule itself is adequate to achieve this aim119.  
159. The final question that must be addressed with respect to the rule of reason is if whether the 
legislation in question is a facility provided in order to obtain this objective.  
160. On this issue, depending on their design and implementation, a legislation directed at pre-
venting the use of purely artificial arrangements may, at first, be a proportionate measure against abuse. 
To determine when a measure is proportional requires a trial of comparability in which it must examine 
if other less burdensome legislations can exist than that in question to achieve the proposed aim, analy-
sing if the sacrifice of another interest in favour of another legislation could reduce.  
161. An anti‑abuse rule has as a legitimate aim, the fight against abusive practices and may 
contain a measure that is suitable for the obtainment of that aim, but all this is compatible with the UE 
Law to the extent that this provision is proportional to the following aim: as we said, the irrebuttable 
presumptions of abuse are rejected by generalists, or inadequate to achieve the intended purpose that is 
no other than to prevent the misuse of the UE freedoms and rights, without that objective, it can dislodge 
a restriction such that threatens its exercise. 
162. To the extent to which the fundamental objective of a regulation is to prevent the use of 
elusive mechanisms, the proportionality test implies that it must guarantee that the rule at issue solely 
applies to avoiding purely artificial arrangements, such as how we have shown in the current work.  
117 Cadbury, cit., para. 59.
118 Opinion of Mr. Advocate geelhoeD in Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, cit., para. 64.
119 Judgment of 11 november 2007, Elisa (Case C‑451/05), ECLI:EU:C:2007:594, para. 81.
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163. For this purpose, the Advocate General GEELHOED120 confirms that «however, the for-
mulation and application in practice of such a test must also satisfy the requirements of proportionality. 
In my view this means that: a) It must be possible for a taxpayer to show that, although the terms of 
its transaction were agreed with the independent parties, there were nonetheless genuine commercial 
reasons for the transaction other than obtaining a tax advantage; b) If such commercial reasons are put 
forward by the taxpayer, their validity should be assessed on a case‑by‑case basis to see if the transac-
tions should be seen as wholly artificial arrangements designed purely to gain a tax advantage; c) The 
information the taxpayer must provide in order to rebut the presumption should not be disproportionate 
or mean that it is excessively difficult or impossible to do so; d) In cases where the payments are found 
to be abusive (disguised distributions) as already mentioned, only the excess part of the payments over 
what would have been agreed with independent parties should be recharacterized as a distribution and 
taxed in the subsidiary’s state of residence accordingly; and; e) The result of such examination must be 
subject to judicial review». 
164. In Ampliscientifica121 the Court, referring to the principle of proportionality considers that 
a national legislation which, lays down a time limit of between one and two years for taxpayers to be 
able to make VAT declarations and payments in accordance with simplified procedures is, in the light of 
the objective of combating tax evasion and bogus legal arrangements, consistent with the principle of 
proportionality. 
165. The absence of a term could have had the effect of allowing the implementation of specific 
operations to justify the ad hoc creation of a legal structure, favouring abuse and fraud whose prevention 
is precisely one of the aims pursued by UE Law122. 
166. As we have seen, to the extent that the purpose of a rule is to combat abusive practices, 
it must guarantee that it applies itself exclusively to the attainment of this purpose, that is none other 
than to avoid the existence of wholly artificial arrangements and that is thus suitable for this objective. 
Lastly, to demand to the Court that each element of the anti‑abuse regulation is defined coherently with 
UE rights and freedoms, will equally demand that a proportionality test is carried out which requires a 
judgement of comparability that must examine if, to obtain the aim pursued, other less burdensome mea-
sures can exist than the one in question, and analysing if the sacrifice of an interest in favour of another 
could have been reduced. 
b) Proportionality test and the existence of wholly artificial arrangements 
167. As we have been able to analyse, the essential content of the freedom of establishment 
implies the possibility that a national citizen participates continuously and in a stable manner to the 
economic life of a Member State different to that that was originally theirs, therefore it seems logical 
to conclude that abuse will consist in the compliance with the formal requirements of the host without 
this they participate, fully and effectively, in the economy of the existing state, in exchange the desire to 
make a profit by artificially creating the conditions required for its obtainment123. 
168. The Court has held that the discovery of the existence of a permanent establishment must 
base itself on objective and verifiable elements by third parties relating particularly to the level of phy-
sical existence of premises, staff and equipment.  
120 Opinion of Mr. Advocate geelhoeD in Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, cit., para. 67.
121 Judgment of 22 may 2008, Ampliscientifica (Case C-162/07) ECLI:EU:C:2008:301.
122 Judgment of 15 june 2006, Heintz van Landewijck (Case C‑494/04) ECLI:EU:C:2006:407, paras. 42‑43, and Judgment 
of 13 december 2007, Batig (Case C-374/06) ECLI:EU:C:2007:788, para. 39.
123 COM (2007) 785 final, p. 3.
The concept of abuse in tax matters within European Union LawDaniel e. Márquez lasso
393Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional (Octubre 2021), Vol. 13, Nº 2, pp. 362-401
ISSN 1989-4570 - www.uc3m.es/cdt - DOI: https://doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2021.6263
169. If the verification of such elements leads to the finding that there is a fictitious establish-
ment in which no effective economic activity in the territory of the host Member State is not exercised, 
should be considered that the establishment has the character of a wholly artificial arrangement124. 
170. Similarly, we have been able to conclude that the implementation of cross‑border opera-
tions, with the objective of benefitting from a more favourable legislation is fully covered by the Treaty, 
even if this is carried out for tax advantage purposes in terms of saving, such as a national citizen cannot 
be deprived of the possibility of invoking dispositions from the Treaty to capitalise from the tax advan-
tages legally offered by the regulations in force in a different Member State to that in which it resides125. 
It is therefore clear that such actions contemplated as valid by law are limited only by the existence, in 
its exercise, of an additional element of abuse126. 
171. In this regard, the Commission already pointed the need to explore the scope for esta-
blishing a non‑exhaustive inventory of fact patterns that generally indicate the presence of an artificial 
arrangement – by way of example, incorporation of a secondary establishment which purports to provi-
de goods or services from another jurisdiction without any real substance or physical operation therein, 
or more generally, types of arrangements which serve no business purpose (or which might be even 
contrary to general business interests, if not entered into for the purpose of avoiding tax)127. 
172. As we have also already analysed in some depth, the Court has been constant in their pos-
tulate that the existence of abuse must be casuistry, such that the irrebuttable presumptions of abuse are 
rejected by generalists, or unsuitable to achieve the intended purpose that is simply to prevent the abuse 
of UE freedoms and rights, to the extent that, the fundamental aim of a rule is the prevention of the use of 
elusive mechanisms, the criteria of proportionality implies that it must guarantee that the rule in question 
applies solely to avoiding wholly artificial arrangements. 
173. However, and although the assertion of the Court of Justice, in the majority of their sen-
tences, allows only those anti‑abuse regulations whose aim is to stop conducting artificial transactions, 
which do not reflect economic reality and that have as their sole or main aim to obtain a tax advantage 
with no other valid motive, it seems loud and clear, that the problem arises in the definition of the term 
artificial, meaning the total lack of economic substance, but it is defined in such a way that it is conside-
rably closer to the simulation. 
174. Additionally, the Court demands that there is a close causal link between the suspicious 
transaction and the tax advantage, which implies that all anti‑abuse regulations must focus a clear con-
nection between the intended purpose of the taxpayer to achieve a certain beneficial tax treatment, and 
the definition of wholly artificial arrangements128.  
175. Before this need to define the term artificial the Court has identified a series of factors that 
do not constitute by themselves and in isolation as a wholly artificial arrangement, for example, the mere 
fact that a subsidiary is established in another Member State does not imply in itself as tax evasion129, 
and the fact that the activities carried out for a secondary establishment in another Member State can be 
developed likewise by the taxpayer from the territory of their Member State of origin, does not necessa-
rily mean that a wholly artificial arrangement exists130. 
124 Cadbury, cit., paras. 67- 68
125 Barbier, cit., para. 71.
126 g. gonzalez garCía, “Una aproximación al contenido de los conceptos de discriminación y restricción en el Derecho 
de la Unión”, in Documentos de Trabajo del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, nº 8, 2004, p. 42.
127 COM (2007) 785 final.
128 V. ruiz alMenDral, “¿Tiene futuro el test de los motivos económicos válidos en las normas antiabuso?”, cit., p. 36.
129 ICI, cit., para. 26.
130 Cadbury, cit., para. 69.
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176. It is completely legitimate for tax considerations to play a role in the decision on where 
to establish a subsidiary131 since the objective of minimising one’s tax burden is a valid commercial 
consideration, as long as the arrangement entered into is not achieved through the artificial transfers of 
profits132, which brings us irretrievably to the analysis of the positive concept of purely artificial arran-
gements which the Court has considered essential in its construction of the doctrine of abuse. 
177. According to the Factortame II133 judgement, the notion of establishment involves the 
actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment for an indefinite period. They must 
simultaneously134 take the requirements of developing a real economic activity through a permanent 
establishment that has sufficient material resources, to be carried indefinitely and that obviously takes 
place in a different Member State of origin.  
178. In general, the effective practice of an economic activity supposes to offer goods and servi-
ces in the market135, which includes the production and commercialisation of products, the establishment 
of services and the exploitation of tangible or intangible assets to obtain returns whilst the demand of 
permanent establishment leads to examine the existence and availability of premises, staff and equipment 
necessary to perform the services136, although it is expressed in the simple existence of an office137. Thus, 
in order that it can be considered that a real and effective establishment exists, through the creation of 
subsidiaries or branches, whether it’s primary or secondary, it is necessary that this is seen as capable to 
offer goods and services with a more or less autonomous management, although the ultimate control is 
carried out from a head office situated in another Member State. Further complications seem to have the 
requirement of the establishment remaining indefinitely to avoid being classified as abusive, as noted in 
the Leur-Bloem138 judgement. 
179. In effect, the creation of structures for a limited time can be indicators of purely artificial 
operations, known as u-turns as well as those operations in which a transfer of residence is claimed 
temporarily, that allows other particular operations to have a considerable tax saving (and against those 
it operates, as anti‑circumvention mechanism, the Exit Taxes).  
180. However, the Court will confirm an operation destined to create a certain structure for a 
limited period and not sustainably, may obey valid economic motives139 which again supposes a need 
of a substance‑overform analysis, to detect when we are actually facing a purely artificial arrangement. 
181. In this respect, the so‑called business purpose test doctrine is configured as a development 
of the finalist or teleological interpretation of the tax regulation and encompasses diverse doctrines that 
have a point in common, that is none other than denying the legal protection of those acts or businesses 
carried out without a real bargaining aim or abusing the rules that recognise these legal forms in the sense 
of using them to obtain a result (tax advantage) that is not the purpose for which the rule was created140. 
182. Thus, in the Cadbury case, the General Advocate LEGER is going to elaborate a test based 
on three elements141 that must serve to differentiate when we are facing an artificial arrangement and 
131 Cadbury, cit., para. 37.
132 Judgment of 26 october 1999, Eurowings (Case C-294/97) ECLI:EU:C:1999:524, para. 44.
133 Factortame II, cit., para. 20.
134 D. WeBer, “Tax avoidance and the EC Treaty Freedoms: A study of limitations under European tax law to the prevention 
of tax avoidance”, Kluwert Law International, La Haya, 2005, p. 31.
135 Judgment of 16 june 1987, Commission/Italy (Case 118/85) ECLI:EU:C:1987:283, para. 7.
136 Opinion of Mr. Advocate leger in Cadbury, para. 112.
137 Judgment of 4 december 1986, Commission/Germany (Case 205/84) ECLI:EU:C:1986:463, para. 21.
138 Leur-Bloem, cit., para. 35. 
139 Leur-Bloem, cit., apartado 42.
140 V. ruiz alMenDral, “¿Tiene futuro el test de los motivos económicos válidos en las normas antiabuso? (sobre la plani-
ficación fiscal y las normas anti‑abuso en el derecho de la Unión Europea)”, cit., p. 36.
141 Opinion of Mr. Advocate leger in Cadbury, paras. 112-114.
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when facing a true practice of the freedom of establishment: the first of the requirements deals with the 
reality of the implementation of the subsidiary in the welcoming State, and leads to examine if the ne-
cessary facilities, staff and equipment are available for the implementation of the services rendered by 
the parent company. 
183. The second requirement refers to the effective character of the rendered services by a sub-
sidiary, requiring examining of the competence of the staff with relation to the rendered services when 
making decisions in the implementation of these services. These amounts to assuming that if all deci-
sions are adopted out of the subsidiary, this results in being only a mere instrument of execution, which 
would amount to an artificial arrangement. 
184. The Court will not consider this second requirement, not only in this judgement but in 
those subsequent to it, such as, Eurofood IFSC, in confirming that in determining the centre of the main 
interests of a debtor company, the simple presumption laid down by the UE legislatation in favour of the 
registered office of that company can be rebutted only if factors which are both objective and ascertaina-
ble by third parties enable it to be established that an actual situation exists which is different from that 
which locating it at that registered office is deemed to reflect. 
185. This could be so in particular in the case of a company not carrying out any business in the 
territory of the Member State in which its registered office is situated. By contrast, where a company 
carried out their business in the territory of the Member State where its registered office is situated, the 
mere fact that their economic choices are or can be controlled by a parent company in another Member 
State is not enough to rebut the presumption laid down by that Regulation142. 
186. Finally, the third of the requirements relative to the value added by the activity of the subsi-
diary, is without a doubt more delicate in applying if the rendered services correspond effectively to the 
real activities carried out in the hosting State: this criteria allows to take into consideration the objective 
situation in which the rendered services by the subsidiary lack all economic interest with relation to the 
activity of the parent company, which would enable us to recognise the existence of a purely artificial 
arrangement in both the lack of benefit payment by the parents company and the  counterpart, making it 
possible to consider an outright transfer of benefits from the parents company to the subsidiary. 
187. This requirement may be applicable to those complex operations that have as their only 
purpose, to provide unity to isolated legal acts which together make sense in relation to the tax advantage 
that intends to strengthen, or in an intangible nature reveal many applicative problems in companies, to 
name an example; that have no productive nature but provide intra‑group services of a financial nature143. 
188. In most cases, the Court in their resolution, will not welcome all the requirements exposed 
by the Advocate General LEGER for the verification of the existence of an artificial arrangement, but 
that will restrict to value the reality of the implementation of the subsidiary in the hosting State deter-
mining it by the availability of premises, staff and equipment needed for the carrying out of rendered 
services to the parent company. 
189. In this way, a restrictive concept of artificial arrangements144 is understood, limiting the 
application of the rules of Fiscal transparency, and leaving aside the assumptions in which, simply en-
142 Eurofood IFSC, cit., paras. 34-35.
143 P.M. herrera Molina, “STJCE 12.9.2006 (Gran Sala), Cadbury Schweppes, As. C-196/04: Las cláusulas antiabuso de 
ámbito exclusivamente internacional pueden basarse en presunciones iuris tantum (a propósito de la subcapitalización)”, in 
P.M. herrera Molina (Dir.), Comentarios de jurisprudencia comunitaria del Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Euro-
peas 2006-2007, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid, 2009, p. 5.
144 Cadbury, cit., para. 67.
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dowed with a minimum economic and institutional introduction, the reality of the establishment is more 
suited to a substance manufactured for profit rather than a genuine exercise of freedoms and rights under 
the Treaty. 
190. In RUIZ ALMENDRAL145 and SANZ GOMEZ146 opinions this interpretation leads to the 
conclusion that, for the Court, the concept of abuse without further representation, would amount to the 
Court focusing on those close behaviours to crude simulations147 as the essential nature of any abusive 
behaviour when applying the artificiality of the operations.  
191. Despite what has been said the Court will require, accordingly with the jurisprudence esta-
blished in the Emsland Stärke148 judgement, the combination of two elements for determining the exis-
tence of a purely artificial arrangement. These are firstly; a subjective element consisting of the intention 
to obtain a tax benefit and, secondly, that this results from the objective and verified elements by third 
parties, particularly at the level of physical existence of establishment where premises, staff and equi-
pment are concerned. This will determine if, despite that they have formally respected the conditions 
foreseen by the EU Law, it has not reached the intended objective of the freedom of establishment149. 
192. If from the verification of such elements it was gathered that the establishment constitutes 
a fictitious implementation that does not carry out any effective economic activity in the territory of the 
hosting Member State, it should consider that such creation has the characteristics of a purely artificial 
arrangement, which is it exactly what is at risk of happening particularly in the cases of a shell or letter-
box subsidiary150 or in letterbox companies151. 
193. In this sense, the abuse will assume the conjunction of these two intrinsically linked and 
relative criteria, on one hand, it is necessary to detach a number of objective factors that despite formal 
observance of the requirements of UE law, the intended purpose is not achieved for this rule: the objec-
tive criterion refers to the existence of a contradiction between the outcome achieved and the intended 
purpose of the UE provision or the freedom at stake. However, the contradiction of the outcome with the 
intended aims cannot itself characterise as an abusive practice, since through the obligations of UE Law 
the advantage obtained cannot be objectively justified by any other consideration than that to circumvent 
the rules in the national regulations. 
194. For this, it is essential to take into account the purely artificial character of these operations 
and must appreciate, how we have already developed, through elements ascertainable by third parties 
of which the absence of an actual establishment is discarded that’s intended for the effective realization 
of economic activities. Henceforth, the analysis must focus on what the intended outcomes for the UE 
legislations are, in case that, once delimited, proceeding to determine whether the prosecuted situation 
is integrated into these objectives. The objective element thus contains two requirements, which are on 
one hand an absolute estrangement between the purpose for which the circumvented rule was created 
and on the other, the carrying out of operations whose essential (and only) aim is to obtain an advantage 
that otherwise had not been possible to obtain. 
145 V. ruiz alMenDral, “¿Tiene futuro el test de los motivos económicos válidos en las normas antiabuso?”, cit., p. 36.
146 r. sanz góMez, “Las cláusulas anti‑abuso específicas tributarias frente a las libertades de circulación de la Unión Eu-
ropea”, cit., p. 105.
147 J.M. CalDerón Carrero and a.J. Martín JiMénez, “Acerca de la necesidad de reconfigurar la política española en mate-
ria de cláusulas antiabuso y fiscalidad directa: las consecuencias derivadas de los casos Cadbury Schweppes y Test Claimants 
in the Thin Cap Group”, in Jurisprudencia Tributaria, Aranzadi, nº 2, 2007.
148 Emsland Stärke, cit.
149 X e Y, cit., paras. 41-42, Eurofood IFSC, cit., paras. 34-35 and Ampliscientifica, cit., para. 21.
150 Eurofood IFSC, cit., paras. 34-35.
151 Judgment of 30 september 2003, Inspire Art (Case C-167/01) ECLI:EU:C:2003:512, para. 101.
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195. However, the subjective element, consisting in the intention to obtain a tax advantage, will 
be more problematic: firstly, because it must complement itself by adding the requirement that such a 
benefit be obtained by artificially creating the conditions needed for its obtainment152.  
196. Based on the premise that a UE national cannot be deprived of the possibility of invoking 
the Treaty provisions because of profiting from tax advantages which are legally provided by the rules 
in force in a Member State other than that in which it resides153, the Court warns that if the subjective 
element is literally in the intention to obtain a tax advantage, it should be treated with caution. In this 
respect, Advocate General POIAREA MADURO154 believes that, to determine the existence of a subjec-
tive element as mentioned in the Emsland-Stärke judgement, does not affect the interpretative character 
of the concept of abuse in EU Law since the Court of Justice linked this subjective element with the 
conclusion that the situation that prompts the application of a certain UE law was merely artificial. 
197. This conclusion of artificiality, in his opinion, must not be based in appreciation of the sub-
jective intentions which invoke the UE law but that must explain the base of a series of verified objective 
circumstances in each particular case.  
198. The intention is not critical to value the abuse, but the activity itself is objectively consi-
dered since the parties’ intentions to abusively obtain a benefit are simply deductible of the artificial 
character of the situation that has to be assessed in the light of a set of objective circumstances155. 
199. The subjective element can only verify the purpose of the activities carried out for the 
obtainment of the elusive aim to an extent. Thus, the Court sustains that in order to find a permanent 
establishment it must be based on objective elements and ascertainable by third parties and concerning 
the elements of judgement that have been studied in this piece of work, and if not verified, it should 
be considered that this creation has characteristics of a purely artificial arrangement. That said, in the 
Emsland-Stärke judgement it will be established that it corresponds to the national court accrediting the 
existence of these elements, whose evidence must conform with the national regulations and as long as 
it does not damage the efficiency of EU Law156. 
200. Ultimately, to the extent that the fundamental objective of an anti‑abuse rule is the used as 
a prevention of the use of elusive mechanisms, the criterion of proportionality implies that the contro-
versial rule must be applied solely to avoid purely artificial arrangements, and to constitute as the final 
section of this work, to define what is understood when the Court prosecutes those suspected of abuse. 
201. From the jurisprudence of The Court of Justice it deduces that the anti‑abuse rules cannot 
be formulated generally but must have as a clear and sole aim, to prevent explicitly circumvention, in 
other words, it must hope to exclude the fiscal advantage through abusive practices consisting of the 
creation of purely artificial arrangements.  
202. As we saw, the Court established a triple analysis test on the anti‑circumvention rule in 
order to verify its compatibility with the UE legislation in terms of the rule of reason and, in this respect, 
try to verify if the rule is justified on general‑interest grounds, that the restriction be apt to ensure the 
152 Emsland Stärke, cit., paras. 52-53, Centros, cit., para. 24; Halifax, cit., paras. 74-75 and Cadbury Schweppes and Cad-
bury Schweppes Overseas, cit., paras. 64.
153 Barbier, cit., para. 71.
154 Opinion delivered on 7 april 2005 in Halifax.
155 D. anDerson, “¿What is abuse of Rights?”, in Alba Conference, Cambridge, 29 july 2006: later cases have played down 
the subjective nature of the test, suggesting that intention should be inferred from objective circumstances.
156 Deutsche Milchkontor and others, cit., paras. 17‑25 and 35‑39; Johnston, cit., paras. 17‑21; FMC and others, cit., paras. 
49-51 and Arco Chemie Nederland and others, cit., para. 41.
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attainment of the objective in question and that it does not go beyond what is necessary to attain that 
objective157.  
203. Thus, from the jurisprudential analysis of the EU test of proportionality it can be drawn 
that it is subject to the concurrence of a series of conditions that are: firstly, as we could conclude from 
the analysis on the Lankhorst Hohorst judgement carried out in this work, regarding the purpose of the 
disputed loan taken out by related entities, the reality was that this constituted a rescue attempt of the 
subsidiary, through full reduction of spending and the attainment of an important save on bank interests, 
although the conditions of this operation differ from those that were practiced within independent parties. 
204. This type of situation in which an operation is not held between linked parties, and in con-
ditions that were practiced between independent parties, can be considered as a purely artificial arrange-
ment, but in any case, the demand of proportionality when applying the anti‑abuse measure foreseen for 
such situations requires that it demonstrates that valid motives exist which can justify such operation, 
which could be understood by the Court as a concept of objective reasonableness158. 
205. Secondly, as we have already noticed, it is the distribution of the burden of proof as it 
responds to the national legislation crediting the existence of indicative elements of the existence of a 
purely artificial arrangement lacking in actual economic motives, so the taxpayer must be entitled to op-
pose the application of anti‑abuse rules, providing relative elements to possible valid reasons for which 
the transactions took place but without being subject to excessive administrative restrictions. 
206. Thirdly, the anti‑abuse regulation must only affect the party in operation that does not fit 
firstly with the principal of full competition, in other words, when a State demonstrates the existence of 
an abuse, the measure that it adopts as a reaction mechanism must also be proportional to the very pur-
pose of the anti‑abuse clause applied, so it should limit such reaction to reverse the consequences of the 
elusive operation, as the Court reveals in the Test Claimants judgement, when confirming that, in order 
that a measure is compatible with the principle of proportionality its necessary that in concluding the 
existence of a purely artificial arrangement lacking in providing any in real commercial reasons for said 
transaction in question, the re‑characterisation of the interest paid as a distribution profit is limited to the 
proportion of the interests which exceeds what would have been agreed had the relationship between the 
parties been one at arm’s length159, without any penalty arising160. 
207. In short, the proportionality presupposes two interests that are relevant to the legal system 
and who are in conflict, with the aim of giving effect to this principle one of the interests in a manner 
least affecting the other, always referred to in terms of a specific case; in this case, not only the appli-
cation of anti‑abuse measure must be appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective but it also 
cannot go beyond what is necessary to achieve it.  
208. Elements such as the burden of proof, the establishment of reasonable presumptive crite-
ria, the permeability of the norm admitting exceptions to its application, or implementation of the own 
criterion of necessity involving a balance of proportionality between the stakes must be absolutely res-
pected by the State seeking to enforce a confrontation with anti‑circumvention measures in EU law and 
especially with the free exercise of fundamental freedoms. 
157 Gebhard, cit., Futura Participations and Singer, cit., de Lasteyrie du Saillant, cit., and Marks & Spencer, cit.
158 J.M. CalDerón Carrero, “STJCE 13.3.2.007, C‑524/04, Case Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group: las Condiciones 
de compatibilidad comunitaria de las cláusulas de subcapitalización (y de precios de transferencia)”, in Comentarios de Juris-
prudencia Comunitaria, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid, 2007, p. 12.
159 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group, cit., para. 83.
160 Halifax, cit., para. 93.
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IV. A concept of an abuse in UE law in tax matters  
209.  Before proposing a concept of an abuse in UE Law it may be appropriate to carry out some 
reflections on philosophical considerations that nourish the legal UE. 
210. There are institutes specialising in the abuse of law and its understanding. Since their stu-
dies delve into the philosophical framework that nourishes positive Law, they cannot reach full unders-
tanding without carrying out a deep investigation on supra legal roots.  
211. RODRÍGUEZ ARIAS examined this to perfection when he confirmed the legislator must 
pay attention due to the mutations in social matters when trying to avoid, where possible, maladjustments 
between the field of social and legal reality (…) so the theory of abuse of law arises to fill new needs in 
society161. 
212. Every time it must be decided whether fault, negligence or recklessness has existed, or, 
where appropriate, when it is necessary to resort to standards of behaviour (such as diligent conduct a 
good man) in such a decision the idea of what is seen as reasonable, or not, is used. We have to admit 
without a doubt, that all the regulations and laws are orientated towards the achievement of a certain 
purpose, in such a way that whoever holds that right, or intends to enforce compliance with a standard, 
has discretion as to how to exercise it. However, such discretion must have certain limits, because if not, 
the subjective practice of law would involve the opposition of another opposing practice of law. 
213. It is obvious that when making decisions on certain facts at legal level, it can lead us to a 
conclusion: that many outcomes exist. This paradox, that is not so easy if any speculative content is isola-
ted, reveals the absolute truth; that when facing certain factual situations, the ambiguity of the wording of 
the required standard allows us to reach different and valid results. Meanwhile, whilst making decisions, 
this freedom of initial interpretation, as we have already said, leads us to the idea of what is and what is 
not reasonable. In this regard, reasonableness is a notion that is found increasingly more prominent at 
legal level, as a result of the idea of the complex reality that does not allow limits to be put in place. 
214. Economic globalization and the breakdown of borders within the UE are two clear exam-
ples of the difficulty in finding a sealed reality. The continuous international legal flow makes it in-
creasingly difficult to find a finished concept in Law, and in this respect the undefined legal concepts 
between those that find the reasonableness are legal instruments that possess a broad interpretive margin 
of discretion that allow to determine the correct solution in a particular case. 
215. We will reasonably understand the term justified, non‑arbitrary to then expand the term to 
the ordinary, the normal and the expected so that everything that is not within those conceptual bounda-
ries is unreasonable and, therefore, not lawful. This is precisely where the notion abuse of law gets its 
full justification: the legality of the reasonable exercise of its own right, or fair compliance with a legal 
obligation, must be discovered when considering the aims that the Law had when recognising these laws 
and obligations, which manifestly exceed the usual limits of the practice of a right (legal standards of 
good faith, morality, and decency), which can be considered abusive and therefore unreasonable. 
216. However, there hasn’t always been an unanimity in the rational concept of law: authors 
such as DWORKIN162 who argues that the individuality of law, such as the monistic concept of law, 
completely faces the concept of general interest, understanding the legal principals as a simple justifica-
tion of individual rights facing the rest of the claims, in such a way that they intended to avoid the risk 
of being subordinated to conflicting collective interests. 
161 l. roDríguez arias, “El abuso del Derecho”, Ediciones Jurídicas Europa América, Buenos Aires, 1971.
162 r. DWorkin, “Taking rights seriously”, 5ª ed. Peral Duckworth & Co. Ltd., London, 1987.
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217. GLENDON amongst others believes that it is difficult to be able to accept the postulate in 
both confirming that it is impossible to admit if someone has the right to something, it is wrong for the 
State to deny them it, although doing so would favour the public interest163. 
218. Based on this confrontation of ideas, it has split a referenced logic to absolute and irrevo-
cable subjective rights, in order to get a more recent idea that defines the theory of abuse as an antisocial 
(abusive) practice of a subjective right. Thus, the figure of abuse of Law tends to condition the practice 
of law to notions that can reach to frustrate them, in the sense that a freedom of aims that would satis-
fy the practice of a law would go against the social interest for which the law was created164, with its 
functions, objectives or purposes created for only legitimately or reasonable exercise.  
219. We can understand that the system decrees its regulations for its fulfilment, not in order to 
serve as a hedging instrument for different purposes than those that were given at its creation. In other 
words, to abuse the law does not consist of violating the rules per se, but that are in apparent conformity 
with it, in a juridical legitimacy of fulfilment that encloses an act that would have the obligation to not 
carry it out under the applied regulation. 
220. The abuse proposes that, through the use of a recognised subjective right and protected by a 
regulation, it provokes damage to foreign (individual or collective, private or general) interest that is not 
protected by a specific legal prerogative and that is configured as something we can define as irrational 
or as ethically reprehensible. But how should the abuse of rights be treated? Applying moral, or ethics, 
in the configuration of whether the conduct being prosecuted is abusive, means the behaviour would be 
interpreted contextually, according to the morals and ethics of that who judges it. To define what goes 
against the justified, the non‑arbitrary or the ordinary, normal and the expected by turning to the right, 
morality or the requirements of good faith (nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit, sit non quam) to define 
what is reasonable and what is not is a debate that, even today, to my mind remains open. 
221. Consequently, to elaborate a concept of abuse of Law in the EU legislation and more con-
cretely in the practice of the freedom of establishment that the Treaty embeds as one of the most funda-
mental freedoms, obliges us to carry out a series of conclusions that will be truly basic premises: on one 
hand, the undeniable right exists that helps citizens of the European Union to choose between those legal 
and tax regimes that would be more beneficial for their economic and personal interests, not invoking 
such election to raise a general presumption of abusive practices and serve the justification of measures 
that go against the practice of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty. 
222. Carrying out cross‑border operations with the purpose of benefitting from a more favoura-
ble legislation is clearly covered by the Treaty, including if this operation is carried out for tax purposes, 
as a national citizen cannot be deprived of the possibility of invoking provisions of the Treaty to take 
advantage of the fiscal benefits legally offered by the rules in force in a Member State different from that 
in which is resides165. 
223. As defined in Van Binsbergen, it is the fact of prevailing the UE Law in an abusive or frau-
dulent way that will be understood as an unreasonable practice, in other words, if it is practiced with 
the aim of obtaining illegitimate benefits that manifestly are not relative with the intended purpose of 
the rule. In this regard, the UE freedoms constitute an essential point of reference when determining 
the spirit and purpose of the anti‑abuse rules established by the Member States, and so, its fundamental 
purpose is the construction of the Internal Market. This comes to reflect the main context in which the 
163 a.M. glenDon, “Rights Talk: The impoverishment of political Discourse”, New York, 1991, p. 40.
164 g. PaloMBella, “El abuso del derecho, del poder y del rule of law”, in DOXA, Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho, nº 
29, 2006, p. 37.
165 Barbier, cit., para. 71.
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Court of Justice has analysed the concept of abuse, and that is none other than to abusively invoke the 
provisions of EU Law with the aim of obtaining advantages in a way that goes against the aims and 
objectives of these provisions. 
224. As we have already analysed, the abusive practice requires the concurrence of an objective 
element composed of an absolute distance from the purpose for which the eluded rule was created and 
for the carrying out of operations whose essential (and only) aim is the obtainment of an advantage that 
in another way has not been possible to obtain. In conjunction, the demand for a subjective element will 
understand the willingness to obtain a fiscal advantage, to find an artificial fiscal evasion plan that will 
result as more problematic to delimit because, as the Court has made clear in its declarations. It will be 
the local court order who should set the actual content and significance of the transactions.  
225. The requirement of this subjective element is not peaceful even within the Court itself, 
whilst in Emsland-Starke it puts the same standards for objective and evidentiary items, however in Ha-
lifax it will exclude it, inclining itself for the option that the legal system must take into consideration the 
purely artificial character of the operations to determine the existence of an abusive behaviour without 
the intentional element having greater involvement, just like in the legal, economic and/or personal na-
tures of the links between the operators involved in the plan of reducing the tax burden. 
226. Consequently, it is essential to take into consideration the purely artificial character of the 
operations that must be seen through elements verified by third parties on which the absence of an ac-
tual establishment intended for the effective deployment of economic activities is apparent, particularly 
where the actual presence of premises, staff and equipment is concerned. 
227. If the verification of these elements deduces that a fictitious deployment exists in which 
no effective economic activity is carried out in the territory of the hosting Member State, it should be 
considered that this creation has the characteristics of a purely artificial arrangement and that it is not 
acceptable under the intended purpose of the UE legal system. 
228. As we have seen, the change of scheme in the tax sphere has certain complex elements: 
it is obvious that it is difficult to accept that the tax burden reduction constitutes as an illicit advantage 
manifestly unrelated to the purpose of the UE legislation, and in this sense, the Court has manifested, 
as a reason to justify the application of anti‑abuse measures, when rejecting purely economic causes in 
terms of tax collection. 
229. The practice of the fundamental freedoms allows its use to make the most of the differences 
of tax treatment derived from the tax competition existing between the Member States; consequently, 
such use cannot be punished, under any concept, by national regulations. Only when their own objec-
tives of the freedoms or the rules of secondary legislation have been breached abusively, is when such 
behaviour deserves response from the national regulations according with the UE regulations. 
230. In conclusion, the abuse of Law supposes the act of overflow in a way that obtains a pur-
pose remote from the one that is understood correctly, which requires interpretive work from the fun-
damental freedoms involved and as we have abundantly exposed, combining the teleological elements 
with the explained objectives. As a colophon to this work, and taking into account the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Justice already analysed, we understand that a concept of abuse of law in the prac-
tice of the freedom of establishment could be defined as the practice consisting in the creation of purely 
artificial arrangements, lacking any real economic content, that is destined solely to circumvent the tax 
regulation, that in normal circumstances would have been a mandatory, with the sole aim of obtaining 
an illicit tax advantage.
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